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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE NO. 1. Did the court err by instructing the jury to determine if the Manager 
of the Club Condominium, L.C. (the "Club") acted with gross negligence or willful 
misconduct pursuant to a standard of a developer and/or contractor? 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. Laws v. Blanding 
City. 893 P.2d 1083, 1984 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 
P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 1996) (no deference). 
Preservation of Issue: Record ("R.") 8591, p. 1387,1.16-25, pp.1498-1499. 
ISSUE NO. 2. Did the court err in refusing to instruct the jury that only lost net 
profits, not gross profits, are recoverable and only then if proven with reasonable certainty? 
Standard of Review: Questions of law reviewed for correctness. Laws, 893 P.2d at 
1984; Billings, 918 P.2d at 466 (no deference). 
Preservation of Issue: R. 8591, p. 1387,1. 16-25, p. 1474,1. 11-17, p. 1499,1. 1-21. 
ISSUE NO. 3. Did the court err in admitting (1) 3rd East's banking expert's banking-
industry-standard testimony without foundation of relevance or reliance thereon, and (2) 3rd 
East's construction expert's construction-industry-standard testimony for arms-length 
transactions, which contradicted the agreements authorized by the parties? 
Standard of Review: Abuse-of-discretion. Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael 119 
S.Ct. 1167, 1170(1999). 
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Preservation of Issue: R. 2769-2771; 2774-2776; 2782-2783; 4035-4037; 8484, p. 76, 
1. 2-18; 8586, p. 538,1. 17-19, p. 539,1. 18-25, p. 540,1. 1-3. 
ISSUE NO. 4. Was there an absence of substantial evidence for the jury to find that 
any acts or omissions by the Manager of the The Club constituted gross negligence or willful 
misconduct and if so, were such actions the proximate cause of any damage proven beyond 
mere speculation to 3rd East? 
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will reverse a jury verdict if, taking the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, the appellant demonstrates that the 
findings lack substantial evidentiary support. Jensen v. Sawyers. 2005, UT 81,1f 96, 130 
P.3d 325; Water & Energy Sys. Tech.. Inc. v. Keil. 48 P.3d 888, 892 (Utah 2002);. 
Preservation of Issue: R. 8064-65; 8198-8200; 8205-8223; 8395-8402; 8587 p. 732, 
1. 12-16, p. 736,1. 15-18, p. 740,1. 11; 8592 p. 1540,1.5-20. 
ISSUE NO. 5. Did the court err in granting 3rd East an award of prejudgment interest 
when its damages were left to the best judgment of the jury? 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. Iron Head Constr., 
Inc. v. Gurnev. 2008 UT App 1.15.176 P.3d 453: Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing 
Co.. L.C. 2004 UT App 227, ^[15, 95 P.3d 1171; Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 
1995). 
Preservation of Issue: R. 8299-8303:8316-8317:8321 -8326:8328:8421:8425:8427: 
8583, pp. 50-54, p. 70,1. 6-18, p. 93,1. 24-25, p. 94,1. 1. 
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ISSUE NO. 6. Did the trial court err in awarding 3rd East attorney fees of 
$226,400.00 against a total claim of $269,520.00 when 3rd East's attorney's affidavit failed 
to adequately allocate attorney fees between its one successful claim for which attorney fees 
were awarded and all other claims successful or unsuccessful? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Jensen, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 325; Pack 
v. Case. 2001 UT App 232, 30 P.3d 436. 
Preservation of Issue: R. 8423-8425; 8521-8530; 8583, pp. 62-66, 70-73, 85-87, pp. 
112-118, 123-124. 
ISSUE NO. 7. Did the court err by awarding 3rd East expert witness fees, copy costs 
and other costs that were not taxable or provided for by contract or law? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 
UT 14, 70 P.3d 35; Young v. State. 2000 UT 91, 16 P.3d 549. 
Preservation of Issue: R. 8317-8321; 8341-45; 8405-09; 8583, pp. 68-70, 73, 88-89. 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-l 19(2) (1996): 
Records kept under this section are subject to inspection and copying at the 
reasonable request and at the expense of any member during ordinary business 
hours . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-128 (1996): 
From time to time, the limited liability company may distribute its property to 
members of the limited liability company upon the basis stipulated in the 
operating agreement if, after distribution is made, the fair value of the assets 
of the limited liability company is in excess of all liabilities of the limited 
liability except liabilities to members on account of their contributions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Stevensen 3rd East, L.C. ("3rd East"), a member of The Club 
Condominium, L.C. ("The Club"), the business of which was the construction and sale of 
The Club Condominiums project (the "Project") in downtown Salt Lake City, asserted a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim against The Club's manager, Russell Watts ("Watts"). The 
jury entered a verdict in favor of 3rd East against The Club for $26,240 (breach of covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing) and against Watts for $474,000 (breach of fiduciary duty) 
(Verdict at Addendum ("A").C-5) and denied 3rd East's punitive damages claim. (Verdict 
Punitive Damages at A.C-6). The court awarded 3rd East attorneys fees of $226,400, 
prejudgment interest of $199,317, expert witness fees of $36,710, copy costs of $8,400, and 
other costs. (Final Judgment, at A.C-9). Watts seeks to overturn the Verdict and reverse other 
rulings of the court. 
Course of Proceedings: 3rd East filed this action on May 9, 2001. R. 1-36. See also 
Am. Comp. R626-666 (A.C-1). Through several pre-trial motions, many of 3rd East's and 
all its members' claims were dismissed. 3rd East's surviving claims were tried in an eight-day 
jury trial in the Third District Court (01/22/07-02/01/07). Watts moved for a Directed 
Verdict on all issues, which the court denied. R. 8587, pp. 732-771; 8591, p. 1496,1. 13-18. 
The jury rendered its Verdict on February 1,2007 (A.C-5,6). Watts filed a JNOV Motion on 
February 15, 2007. R. 8198-8226. The trial court denied the Motion and entered its Final 
Judgment on September 4, 2007. R. 8544-8548. Watts filed a Notice of Appeal on 
September 19, 2007. R. 8564-8566 (A.C-10). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Stevensen and Watts determined to build a 45-48 unit residential condominium project 
(Ex. 346) on land owned by Stevensen. The parties formed The Club by signing an 
Operating Agreement (A.D-1), with R.K.W. 96, L.C. ("RKW") and 3rd East each owning 
50%. Watts was named Manager. 3rd East contributed land valued at $631,000 (R. 4022-
4023), and RKW contributed $180,000 and a Development Fee (the "Fee") booked at 
$451,000. R. 8590, p. 1362,1.2-3. The Operating Agreement authorized Watts Corporation 
("Watts Corp"), an affiliate of Watts, to act as general contractor and Kevin Watts Architects 
(the "Architect"), also an affiliate of Watts, to act as architect. On June 15,1997, The Club, 
by the signature of Mr. Stevensen, fee of 8% of total construction costs and interest of 12% 
per annum on unpaid draws, with substantial completion to occur 15 months after 
commencement, subject to forces majeure (Ex. 10). The Operating Agreement (§4.1) also 
provided that changes to the budget were to be agreed to in writing by RKW and 3rd East. 
The Club obtained a construction loan (the "Bank Loan" (Ex. 18)) for less than 
needed to construct the Project. R. 8586, pp. 398-399. The plan was to use proceeds of early 
sales to complete remaining units and to borrow additional funds from less-expensive private 
lenders, as needed. R. 8586, pp. 480-481. Watts Corp, Stevensen, and Watts jointly borrowed 
additional funds from private lenders. Ex. 564 (A.D-8), 566, 567 and 568 (A.D-9). 
The Club obtained its building permit on August 11, 1997. R. 8590, p. 1311,1. 5-6. 
The model unit was completed in November, 1998, the remaining units were only to be 
finished to sheetrock stage so buyers could choose finishes and money would be saved on 
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loan interest. R. 8585, p. 257, 1. 17-22; 8586, p. 409, 1. 1-4; 8590, pp. 1316-1317. On or 
about October 21, 1997, Watts and Stevensen agreed to a new proforma for construction 
(" 10/21/97 Proforma") which estimated hard costs of $6.7 million (more than the Bank Loan) 
and net profits of $785,601.00. Ex 22 (A.D-5). Additional financial information (including 
a 10/30/98 Proforma and a February 11,1999, Financial Review was provided from time to 
time, adjusting cost projections as they became clearer (A.D-5, 6). Ex. 23, 50. As the lobby 
and common areas neared completion, Watts Corp began funding part of the construction 
costs. R. 8585, p. 299,1. 20-23; Exs. 51, 33. 
Because of their inability to make sales, the Stevensens and their son were removed 
from marketing pursuant to a March 25, 1999 memorandum (the "March Agreement"), 
which delineated (1) 3rd East's agreement to cease marketing; (2) commissions to be paid 
(Watts Group 3% and 3rd East 1%); (3) priority of debt repayments; and (4) the reduction of 
the interest rate payable to Watts Corp to 9%. Ex. 7 (A.D-14). 
In September 1999, with more than half of the units unsold, Watts provided Stevensen 
the 9/5/99 Proforma. Ex. 24 (A.D-5) & 762 (A.D-11 at Ex. 8); R. 8587, p. 629,1. 5-15. 
Projected costs increased and net profits decreased. At this time, The Club had already 
advanced $162,000 to 3rd East. A.D-11. 
Subsequent to a meeting regarding the 9/5/99 Proforma, Stevensen was no longer 
involved with the Project despite repeated contacts from Watts. Watts terminated the $5,000 
monthly advances against to 3rd East testifying that his decision to do so was "[b]ased on 
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there being no profit in the project..."1 R. 8585, pp. 315-316; 8587, p. 631,1. 16-18. Watts 
also discontinued 3rd East's 1% payments under the March Agreement. Ex. 599 (A.D-10). 
The Club didn't sell its last unit until November 3, 2002 (A.D-11 at Ex. 8). Watts 
testified that the slow market caused an increase of $2,050,000.00 in four primary cost 
categories beyond his control: (a) hard construction costs ($800,000 increase for finish 
improvements dictated by buyers to obtain sales); (b) interest costs ($905,000 increase due 
to the slow, extended sales period); (c) marketing costs ($222,000 increase due to the slow, 
difficult sales period); and (d) actual utility costs ($39,000 increase due to maintaining units 
over extended sales period). Exs. 22,708,797,798; R. 8590, pp. 1269-1270, pp. 1383-1384. 
RKW lost $159,562.00 in cash and was never paid its Fee. RKW's investment loss was 
$609,782 (Ex. 793). 3rd East contributed land valued at $631,000.00, and after receipt of its 
profit advances ($162,000.00) its investment loss was $469,000 (Ex. 793). According to the 
stipulated accounting of The Club, including credit for unpaid 1% commissions 
($53,242.00),2 3rd East was over-disbursed $26,241.00 and RKW was owed $26,241.00. 
A.D-11 at Ex. 1. 
SUMMARY 
The jury verdict in favor of 3rd East, as a member of The Club, and against Watts, as 
manager, for lost profits arising out of the development and sale of a residential 
1
 3rd East's counsel affirmed that the discontinued monthly draw was not part of 
3rd East's claim against Watts. R. 8587, p. 686,1. 1-9, p. 738,1. 19-25. 
2
 1% commissions included in the stipulated accounting (Order reciting 3rd East's 
withdrawal of claim for accounting. R. 6866-75 at R. 6973). See also A.D-11. 
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condominium project during a slow sales period was the result of erroneous jury instructions, 
irrelevant and prejudicial expert testimony, and a lack of substantial evidence proving 
liability, proximate cause, or damages. As a result of the faulty verdict, the court erroneously 
awarded prejudgment interest, attorney and expert witness fees, and other costs. 
The verdict was the result of the court's instruction to apply a professional 
builder/developer standard to measure Watts' conduct as manager rather than one of an 
ordinary prudent person. Such a heightened standard is not justified by the law of LLC's or 
its guiding corporate principles. 
The jury was also erroneously instructed that they could use any formula reasonable 
to them to determine damages rather than being instructed to complete a net profits analysis. 
The court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant, prejudicial, and unreliable 
expert testimony regarding industry standards in banking and construction. The banking 
standards, never relied upon by 3rd East, only confused the issues as there was no damage 
from any such claimed breach. The construction expert's standards testimony disregarded 
the parties' agreements to permit Watts to engage in self-dealing and was based on inaccurate 
facts and faulty logic. 
No substantial evidence was provided to establish gross negligence, willful 
misconduct, or proximate cause. In fact, intervening causes beyond the Manager's control 
were admitted by 3rd East's own expert. Finally, damages were also speculative. No 
unnecessary costs or lost sales were established. 
Any award was left to the best judgment of the jury. Nevertheless, the court 
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disregarded Utah's established standards to award prejudgment interest and awarded it 
anyway. 
As additional error, the court awarded attorney fees despite deficient affidavits that 
did not allocate time between parties and claims. 
Finally, the court erroneously awarded expert witness fees and other costs in violation 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah law regarding consequential damages. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1. Did the court err by instructing the jury to determine if the Manager of the 
Club Condominium, L.C. (the "Club") acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct 
pursuant to a standard of a developer and/or contractor? 
1.1 The Trial Court Committed Error by Imposing a Builder/Developer Standard 
on Watts as the Manager of The Club. This Court should find that the trial court imposed 
an incorrect, heightened standard of care on Watts as manager of a limited liability company 
("LLC"). The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness without deference to the trial court. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 
461, 466 (Utah 1996); Laws v. Blanding City. 893 P.2d 1083, 1984 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
The trial court correctly determined that the standard of liability of a manager of an 
LLC is the gross-negligence and willful-misconduct standard of corporate law. R. 7133-
7138 (A.C-3).3 See also Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited Liability 
Company Acts, 79 A.L.R. 5th 689, 698 (where characteristics originated from corporate law, 
corporate principles are used to resolve the issues). Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807 (2001) has since adopted this standard. 
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46 P.3d 323, 326-329 (Wyo. 2002); Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'l Hosp.. LLC. 217 F.3d 379, 
385 (5th Cir. 2000). The court, however, incorrectly instructed the jury that Watts must 
exercise the skill and learning of a builder and developer according to industry standards. 
Jury Inst. 51, R. 8172 (A.C-4). The court should have consistently applied Utah corporate 
principles which do not impose on officers and directors a standard of & professional* While 
a manager's skill and learning may be considered, the erroneous instruction created a new 
standard of care. The heightened standard increased the liability of an LLC manager beyond 
the law. 
1.2 The Court's Erroneous Instruction Likely Affected the Verdict. There is a 
reasonable likelihood that the erroneous instruction affected the Verdict. See Haupt v. 
Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, | 38, 131 P.3d 252. Watts was acting as the Manager, not the 
developer (that was RKW) or the contractor (that was Watts Corp) (Ex. 4 at §§ 4.1, 10.1). 
The court permitted testimony of construction industry standards. See Issue No. 3 below. 
This testimony, together with the erroneous instruction, created confusion as 3rd East 
continually asserted the deficiencies of the contractor and the developer. 3rd East did not sue 
the contractor. See (A.C-1). 3rd East made claims against RKW in its capacity as a member 
of The Club not as the developer and did not even submit those claims to the jury. R. 8188-
8195. None of these claims were submitted to the jury. See id. R. 8188-8195. The claims 
submitted to the jury related to Watts as Manager of The Club. R. 8194. 
4
 Officers/directors are to discharge duties "with the care an ordinary prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances." Utah Code Ann. 
§16-10a-840(l). 
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The combination of the erroneous instruction, and the irrelevant, prejudicial 
testimony of industry standards permitted the jury to consider this case as though it were one 
against a builder/developer for negligent construction rather than a case against a manager 
of an LLC for mismanagement likely resulting in an erroneous Verdict. 
ISSUE NO. 2. Did the court err in refusing to instruct the jury that only lost net profits, not 
gross profits, are recoverable and then only if proven with reasonable certainty? 
2,1 The Trial Court Failed to Properly Instruct the Jury on Net Profits Damages. 
The propriety of jury instructions presents a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness without deference to the court. Billings, 918 P.2d at 466; Laws, 893 P.2d at 
1984. 3rd East claimed that Watts' acts diminished "the profit and return of capital to 3rd 
East." R. 643-644 (A.C-1). The court did not properly instruct the jury that a claim for lost 
profits requires reasonable certainty of lost net profits (not gross profits as only net profits 
may be recovered). Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 2004 UT App 227, 
f l8 , 95 P.3d 1171; Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986). Net 
profits must be proven with "supporting evidence of overhead expenses, or other costs of 
producing income from which a net figure can be derived.55 Carlson, 2004 UT App 227, [^18; 
Sawyers, 722 P.2d at 774. At a minimum, opinions or estimates of lost profit must be based 
on objective facts, figures or data from which the amount of lost profit may be ascertained. 
Szczepanik v. First S. Trust Co., 883 S.W. 2d 648, 649 (TX 1994). "Proof of loss of gross 
income only is an insufficient foundation for proof of amount of damages." Sawyers, 722 
P.2d at 774; Atkin. Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 
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1985). Moreover, testimony of expectation is insufficient as it is purely speculation. 
Szczepanik. 883 S.W. 2d at 649. 
The court permitted the jury to use any formula or theory for determining damages 
which is based upon the evidence of the case and which you believe to be reasonable. See 
Jury Inst. 53; R. 8174; (A.C-4). Before 3rd East was awarded any lost profits, the amount of 
net profits the Project would have made but for Watts' actions should have first been 
objectively determined. The court's damages instruction did not properly direct the jury to 
undertake the required analysis and was, therefore, in error. 
2.2. The Erroneous Instruction Resulted in a Damage Award in Violation of Utah 
Law and Based on Speculation. There is a reasonable likelihood that the erroneous 
instruction affected the damage award (Haupt) as Utah case law illuminates. See Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 418-19 (Utah 1989) (reversing jury award of lost 
profits based solely on speculation, e.g., allegations of lost customers but no proof); 
Sawyers, 722 P.2d at 774 (lack of evidence of overhead and other expenses to permit 
reasonable calculation of net profits is fatal to claim for lost profits); Carlson, 2004 UT App 
227,1flfl7, 20 (upholding directed verdict, as there was no evidence of gross profits or costs 
to determine net profits); Szczepanick, 883 S.W.2d at 649-650 (instructed verdict should 
have been granted as lost profits based proof upon expectation is speculation); HoltAtherton 
Indus. Jnc. v. Heine, 835 S.W. 2d 80,85 (Tex. 1992) (reversing award of lost profits for lack 
of proof of lost contracts). 
3rd East's damage evidence was nothing but an expectation of buyers and profits. To 
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support a claim that lower-priced units should have been built, 3rd East presented no proof 
of income or expenses that would have been incurred (or avoided). There is a complete lack 
of evidence of (a) any available buyers or specific sales that were lost, or (b) of other similar 
projects at that time that made any profit or experienced less of a loss. 3rd East's accounting 
expert ("Teuscher") simply used the actual sales proceeds (as set forth in the stipulated 
accounting (A.D-11)) achieved during the 3-year sales period for the Project as constructed 
(including upgrades) and disregarded all increased costs other than commissions. Ex. 97 
(A.D-7). Teuscher did not provide any objective facts, figures or data to determine what 
costs were necessary or not, or what revenues could have been other than those obtained. R. 
8587, p. 589,1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24. 3rd East's construction expert could not identify any 
unnecessary costs, potential sale prices, or availability of buyers. R. 8585, p. 159,1. 8-25, 
p. 160,1. 1-22, p. 161,1. 5-12. Where such evidence is lacking, this Court and others have 
found that jury verdicts should be overturned, damage awards reversed, and directed verdicts 
of dismissal upheld. See Issue 4, Lack of Evidence of Damages. Because of the erroneous 
instruction and failure of proof, the Verdict must be overturned. 
ISSUE NO. 3. Did the court err in admitting (1) 3rd East's banking expert's banking-
industry-standard testimony without foundation of relevance or reliance thereon, and (2) 3rd 
East's construction expert's construction-industry-standard testimony for arms-length 
transactions, which contradicted the agreements authorized by the parties? 
A trial court has a "gatekeeping function" to determine whether testimony rests on a 
reliable foundation, is relevant, or unfairly prejudicial prior to admitting it. Goebel v. Denver 
& Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F. 3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000). "Evidence which is not 
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relevant is not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. The court should not admit evidence the 
probative value of which is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Utah R. Evid. 403. Error is reversible "only 
if, absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that there would have been a more 
favorable result." Carlson, 2004 UT App 227, If 26; Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr, Ltd. v. 
Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
3.1. Banking Industry Testimony. The lower court permitted Kesler to testify regarding 
industry standards in construction lending, notwithstanding Appellant's objection. The court 
reserved final ruling on Appellant's Motion in Limine until trial. R. 4036-4037. At trial, the 
court permitted Kesler's testimony explaining: 
it seems to me that //the standards of the industry are somehow implicated and 
//there were testimony indicating that a party then relied upon the standards 
of the industry and they weren't followed or something like that, it could be 
relevant. We don yt have that testimony because Mr. Stevensen hasn yt testified 
yet, so my feeling was that it could be relevant at some point but we don't 
know at this point. 
R. 8586, p. 539,1. 21-25, p. 540,1. 1-3 (emphasis added). 
Kesler opined that a lender's biggest risk is a project running out of money before it 
is completed, lenders protect themselves by placing restrictions on changes to keep loans in 
balance, and banks generally require borrowers to use their own funds when their loans get 
out-of-balance. R. 8586, pp. 536-538. Kesler opined that Watts did not comport with the 
industry standards (R. 8992); namely, Watts had (a) made changes to the plans without 
always timely informing the bank as required by the loan documents, and (b) permitted the 
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loan to get out-of-balance because of said changes (R. 8993, 8996). 
Kesler's testimony is not reliable. He admitted that he did not review any internal 
bank records, so he did not know what the bank knew or when it knew it. R. 8996-8997. He 
could only speculate. Thurston v. Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438, Tf 20, 
83P.3d391 (experts are not permitted to speculate). Kesler admitted he did not know if The 
Club contributed its own funds when the loan got out-of-balance. R. 8993. Watts' deposition 
testimony read into the record during Kesler's testimony confirms that The Club was doing 
upgrades at its own expense. R. 8995. See also A.D-11. 
Kesler's testimony is not relevant. Parties are free to establish their own course of 
dealing and are not required to follow industry standards. Such is the case here. Furthermore, 
at no time did 3rd East allege in its Opposition to Watts' Motion in Limine or in testimony, 
that it relied upon industry standards in banking. Absent some alleged reliance on banking 
industry standards, the testimony is irrelevant. The bank is the proper party to complain of 
any nonconformance with banking industry standards. However, Kesler admitted (to the 
court's surprise) that the bank never declared the loan in default and never foreclosed. R. 
8993-8994, 8997. 
Kesler's testimony was nothing but a prejudicial red herring as to Watts' alleged gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. It was more prejudicial and misleading than probative of 
any fact of consequence and confused the jury. The court abused its discretion by admitting 
it. Watts should be granted a new trial. 
3.2 Construction Industry Testimony. The court permitted 3rd East's construction 
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expert ("Larsen") to testify regarding construction industry standards over Watts' objection. 
The court ruled: 
I'm going to let him testify and if he wants to testify about industry standards 
you can rip him apart on cross examination and show those standards are not 
consistent with the agreements, for example, or whatever else you would like 
to show. 
R. 8584, p. 76,1.2-18. 
Larsen's testimony was irrelevant, unreliable, and prejudicial. First, Larsen testified 
that the Construction Contract was not one that you would ever enter into with a stranger 
because it was a cost-plus contract without a guaranteed maximum price and some 
jurisdictions don't allow those. R. 8584, pp. 89-90. This testimony was irrelevant because 
3rd East's claims were not based upon the terms of the contract. R. 8583, pp. 26-27 
(admission by 3rd East's counsel). The testimony served only to prejudice and mislead. 
Larsen also testified that the liability limits of the Architect's Contract were less than 
would be expected in an industry arms-length contract. R. 8585, pp. 119-120. See Ex. 11 
(A.D-3). However, the terms of the contract were agreed to by The Club and no claims were 
ever made against the Architect. See A.C-1. This testimony was therefore not relevant and 
served only to prejudice and mislead. 
Larsen testified that The Club's contracts with the contractor and Architect were to 
be enforced as arms-length contracts with third parties. R. 8584, pp. 141-142. This is not 
true, however, since the Operating Agreement establishes an arms-length standard only in 
one instance: the payment to Watts Corp and the Architect (to be based on their customary, 
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arms-length fees) (Ex. 10, §4.1 (A.D-2)). Nevertheless, Larsen was permitted to opine that 
the Construction Contract was not enforced as an arms-length transaction. He testified that 
in an arms-length transaction you would find letters from the owner to the contractor 
enforcing deadlines. In this case, however, Watts would be writing such letters to himself. 
R.8584, p. 113, 1. 3-15. How would this have helped the project? 3rd East's counsel 
acknowledged that Watts was the representative for the contractor and The Club and in both 
capacities knew what was going on. R. 8588, pp. 943-944. This testimony only served to 
prejudice and mislead. 
Larsen particularly criticized the Architect's failure to review draw requests and 
presumed this failure permitted the contractor to make changes without knowledge of the 
owner, increasing costs and extending performance. R. 8585, pp. 122-128. However, in this 
case, the owner's representative was the contractor's representative. Therefore, the owner 
did have knowledge of the changes. This testimony is not relevant to the structure of the 
transaction and served only to prejudice, mislead, and confuse. 
Finally, Larsen testified that he did not think that Watts Corp should have charged 
itself interest. R. 8585, p. 186,1. 12-25. This testimony was an irrelevant incongruity vis-a-
vis the Construction Contract, which provided for the payment of interest at 12% for late 
payments, later reduced to 9%. (A.D-14, 2 §14.1). 
Larsen was 3rd East's primary witness, yet he disregarded the very nature of the 
members' agreement to use affiliated entities and based his opinions on erroneous premises. 
Admission of his testimony was an abuse of discretion. (Contrary to the court's rationale, 
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cross examination was insufficient because the damage had already been done.) The jury 
was lead to believe that the contracts were improper and that Watts' actions should have 
conformed with an arms-length transaction. That is misleading, confusing and prejudicial. 
Watts should be granted a new trial. 
ISSUE NO. 4. Was there an absence of substantial evidence for the jury to find that any acts 
or omissions by the Manager of The Club constituted gross negligence or willful misconduct 
and if so, were such actions the proximate cause of any damage proven beyond mere 
speculation to 3rd East? 
4.1. Watts1 Obligation to Marshal the Evidence. To meet his burden of proving a lack 
of substantial evidence to overturn the Verdict, Watts must marshal all of the evidence that 
might possibly support the Verdict and then expose the fatal flaw. Interiors Contracting, Inc. 
v. Smith Halander & Smith Assocs.. 881 P.2d 929,933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).5 The evidence 
is as follows: 
Stevensen testified that he did not have construction experience prior to the deal. R. 
8587, p. 613,1.4-11, p. 618,1. 10-11. He didn't know what the costs were (Id. at p. 664) and 
received documents infrequently from Watts. Id. at p. 634. He testified that he never saw 
the plans (Ex. 792). Id. at p. 673. He testified that he never had any discussions with Watts 
about the costs of items, and that Watts never came to him for any approvals or 
recommendations. Ld. at pp. 641-642. 
5
 In the event the Court entertains the possibility that Watts has not met his burden 
to marshal despite his extensive efforts, Watts implores this Court to exercise its 
discretion to review the record to determine if the decision below had adequate factual 
support. See Martinez v. Media Payments Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints, 2007 UT 42, fflf 17-19, 164 P.3d 384. This unjust Verdict must not be permitted to 
stand. 
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Stevensen testified that he was told they were going to get the Project done as fast as 
they could because time was money. Id. at p. 614. He was told to expect a projected profit 
of $800,000 from the Project. Id. at p. 617. He and Watts did not have discussions regarding 
that expectation frequently, but he was periodically given memos suggesting the profit would 
be $800,000. Id. at p. 618. He noticed in the memos that some of the information was 
changing. Id. He testified he was dealing with a professional, the manager, his partner, and 
he trusted him. Id. Stevensen also testified that he couldn't recall Mr. Watts telling him 
about risks to profit other than costs. Id. at p. 619. 
3rd East stipulated that Watts had the background and experience with which to make 
projections, formulate budgets, and anticipate issues with respect to the Project. R. 8590, p. 
1183,1. 18-23. When they decided on the type of project to develop, Watts gave Stevensen 
a Proforma (the 1/2/97 Proforma showing $800,000 in projected profits. Ex. 20 ([TS00005, 
3).6 The Club ended up being nicer than originally conceived. R. 8586, pp. 370-371. On 
February 20,1997, Stevensen initialed a Club Bank Budget (Ex. 360) although he didn't read 
it. R. 8587, pp. 705-706. 
An appraisal was prepared as a part of the efforts to obtain financing (the 
"Appraisal"). Ex. 16 (A.D-4). The Appraisal gave a non-market value to the Project of 
$8,160,000.7 (Ex. 16 at p. 2 of cover letter). The Appraisal referred to absorption rates (the 
6
 Stevensen's counsel stipulated that Stevensen produced all documents with a 
Bates stamp commencing with "TS" and that he had received them. R.8587, p. 635. 
7
 The Free Appraisal defined "Market Value" as "the most probable price which a 
property should bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a 
1Q 
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time it takes for buyers in the market to purchase units constructed and offered for sale) and 
advised that absorption of higher priced units may be problematic. R. 8994; A.D-4 at pp. 64-
65. Watts saw the Appraisal. R. 8585, p. 225, 1. 16-17. The Club hired the Architect in 
April, 1997 (A.D-3). Larsen testified that the Architect's Contract differed from a true arms-
length relationship as the liability limits were lower than usual. R. 8585, p. 119,1. 22-25, p. 
120,1. 1-17. On May 23, 1997, The Club received a financing proposal from The Bank that 
referred to the Appraisal. Ex. 15. 
On June 15, 1997, The Club, by the signature of Stevensen, hired Watts Corp as the 
general contractor, using a cost plus percentage fee contract which included provisions for 
interest (12% per annum) on late payments. A.D-1, 2; R. 8586. 3rd East's construction 
expert ("Larsen") testified that the Construction Contract was not the type of contract that 
you would enter into with a stranger.8 R. 8584, p. 89. Larsen testified that changes increased 
payment to Watts Corp by virtue of the terms of the Construction Contract. R. 8585, p. 151, 
1. 9-11. Watts testified that the fee to Watts Corp increased as costs went up. R. 8586, p. 
365,1. 21-24. Larsen criticized Watts because certain documents were not in existence and 
not attached to the Construction Contract, namely a Homeowner Selection List and a 
Construction Budget dated June 25,1997(A.D-2V R. 8584, p. 419,1. 14-16;. 8587, pp. 701-
702; R. 8590, pp. 1215-1216. 
fair sale." Ex. 16 at p. 3. 
8
 3rd East's counsel affirmed that the cost/plus contract was not the basis for their 
claim-it was not an issue, the parties agreed to it, and the contract by itself was not a 
breach of fiduciary duty. R. 8583, pp. 26-27. 
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The Architect completed the plans (Ex. 792) on or about June 20, 1997. R. 8584, pp. 
936-937. On July 11, 1997, The Club got a Bank Loan (Ex. 18) based upon the bulk rate 
value of the Project established by the Appraisal, not the retail value. R. 8585, p. 250,1.23-
24. 3rd East's banking expert (Kesler) testified of banking industry standards and that Watts' 
conduct did not comport with the banking industry standards. See Issue 3.1 above. 
Hard Costs in the Bank Loan budget were $5,102,000 and the maturity date of the 
Bank Loan was March 11, 1999 (Ex. 18). Kesler opined that Watts intentionally borrowed 
less than needed to construct the Project based upon the proformas. R. 8996. Watts' 
deposition testimony stated that Paul Thurston (a banker for the Bank) knew that they were 
borrowing less than they needed, but the bank people didn't. R. 8998. Kesler opined that 
Watts seemed to distinguish between the Bank and Paul Thurston. R. 8998. 
Watts knew there was a risk of running out of money before the Project was 
completed. R. 8586, p. 399,1. 4-8. Stevensen said that he did not expect the construction 
project to run out of money before it was entirely built. R. 8587, p. 618. Stevensen said he 
did not expect the Bank Loan to become due prior to completion of the Project. Id. 
Watts Corp generated a construction schedule with a start date of August 11,1997 and 
completion in 11 mos (Ex. 41). The Club obtained its building permit on August 11,1997. 
R. 8590, p. 1311. The Construction Contract called for Substantial Completion with 15 
months after the date of commencement. A.D-2. Watts Corp commenced construction 
within ten days after obtaining the building permit. Id. Larsen stated that he did not see any 
effort on the part of Watts Corp to push subcontractors to perform within the schedule or 
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evidence of Daily Reports. R. 8584, p. 94,1. 1-5, p. 112,1. 14-25. Larsen said some of the 
subcontractor contracts were cost plus contracts, therefore, Watts was unable to determine 
what his ultimate costs might have been. Id. at pp. 105-106. 
Between July and October 1997 there were some redesigns. R. 8585, p. 252,1. 1-5. 
On or about October 21, 1997, the members agreed to the 10/21/97 Proforma which 
projected hard construction costs of $6.7 million (an amount more than the Bank Loan) and 
projected profits of $785,601.9 Despite not recalling the document, Stevensen testified that 
Watts represented he would build the building for that amount. R. 8587, p. 697,1. 22-23. 
Larsen testified that there is an industry standard that changes are not made to plans 
after they are finalized because changes always have costs associated with them and they 
cause delay, and delay causes increased interest. R. 8584, pp. 101-104. Larsen opined that 
Watts Corp made numerous changes to the Project after the plans were completed and in the 
first year (before sales slowed). He said the changes delayed construction by more than a 
year and that alone increased interest including the interest paid to Watts Corp. Id. at p. 104. 
Larsen opined that the delay caused by the changes caused damage because the faster you 
finish, the more money you make, because the shorter your loan is from the bank because 
interest typically decreases once construction is finished. R. 8584, p. 112,1. 8-11. 
Larsen identified one change: a change to the mechanical system. R. 8584, pp. 96-97. 
9
 Exs. 18, 22 (A.D-5); R. 8585, pp. 239-240, p. 251,1. 20-22; R. 8587, pp. 696-
697; R. 8590, p. 1208,1. 4-6, p. 1287,1. 5-7, p.1382,1. 2-3, 19-22. (Watts testifying: 
"Yes, Ted and I signed this budget agreeing that we would move forward based on this 
projection as partners of The Club, LC"). 
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He doubted the change was intended to save The Club money since Watts Corp went back 
to the contractor for a new bid. Larsen testified that going back to the same contractor rarely 
results in a better price because they already have the contract. R. 8585, pp. 155-156. Larsen 
stated that other changes were discussed in the weekly meetings. R. 8584, pp. 101-104. 
Larsen opined that Watts made the changes to make a monument to further his reputation 
based upon Watts' deposition testimony that they tried to build the best project for the 
marketplace and that he hoped he had a good reputation. R. 8584, p. 92; R. 8585, p. 150. 
Larsen5 s opinion was that Watts should have been conscious of the costs of upgrades versus 
the value he could obtain for them. R. 8585, p. 152,1.15-22. He said Watt's changes made 
the Project more expensive and he was not sure they increased proportionately to the selling 
price. He did not see any evidence that there was an investigation they would reap the added 
value of the changes in sales. R. 8585, p. 151,1.12-14, p. 206,1. 5-15; 8584,p.l08,l. 18-25. 
No less than nine changes were made to the Project.10 Changes to the lobby may have 
increased costs by $25,000.00 to $40,000.00. R. 8586, p. 376,1. 1-8. Larsen opined that the 
changes suggested that Watts did not control the changes to the detriment of the Project, 
reflecting a lack of exercise of skill in managing the Project. R. 8585, pp. 197-198. Larsen 
testified that he did not know if Stevensen was involved in the changes, but if he was, he was 
likely not aware of the impact. R. 8585, pp. 152-153. Stevensen testified that he had nothing 
10
 (1) facade (R. 8586, p. 375); (2) lobby (R. 8588, p. 981); (3) pilasters (Id.); (4) 
roof (Id. at p. 922); (5) unit layout (Id. at p. 926); (6) toilet placement (Id. at pp. 923-924); 
(7) unit finishes (Id. at p. 928); (8) trash chute (R. 8587, p. 643); and (9) courtyard (Id. at 
p. 675). 
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to do with the lobby. R. 8587, at p. 675. When questioned as to the impact of the changes 
on costs Larsen said: "All I have is the end result of the changes. There was an increase and 
extend[sic] duration of performance which Mr. Watts said in his deposition resulted from his 
changes." R. 8585, p. 153,1. 25, p. 154,1. 1-4. For that opinion, Larsen relied on Watts' 
deposition testimony answering the question "Why did it take longer than your original 
projected 14 months or so? A. Just level of finish - level of finish.11 R. 8590, p. 1319,1. 4-
22. With respect to the decision to complete units as buyers were found, Larsen opined that 
the parties could have completed the entire construction and ended their obligations to the 
Bank by converting to a new loan. R. 8585, pp. 161-62. 
Larsen testified that Watts, as the manager of The Club, did not require the Architect 
to monitor and interact with the contractor as in a typical arms-length relationship. R. 8584, 
p. 184. He found no evidence of periodic visits by the Architect or his representative as 
required by Sections 2.6.5 and 2.6.11 of the Architect's Contract. A.D-3; R. 8584, p. 93, p. 
97, 1. 2-7; R. 8585, pp. 121-122, pp. 124-125. He reasoned that since the Architect 
conducted no site visits, there were no reports of faulty construction for which the contractor 
should not have been paid. R. 8584, pp. 93-94. He testified that the Architect's Contract was 
not carried out in a typical arms-length manner (e.g., § 2.6.10 calling for the Architect to 
review payment applications was not performed (R. 8585, pp. 122-123), and § 2.6.14 no 
issuance of final certificate of payment (R. 8585, p. 126)). Dazely did not review draw 
requests. R. 8588, pp. 944-945. Larsen testified that he did not see any evidence of the 
Architect trying to realize cost savings on the Project. R. 8584, p. 109, 1. 6-11. (Watts 
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admitted the architect was not involved in the budget, he was only to ensure that the Project 
was built to plans and codes. $. 8586, p. 416,1. 14-15, 491-94) 
Larsen testified that did not see evidence that the Architect reviewed any shop 
drawings. R. 8585, p. 125,1. 6-9. He opined that The Club lost the benefits of a third-party 
architect resulting in delays, unreviewed changes, and lost money. R. 8585, pp. 127-128. 
He testified that in true arms-length transactions the owner would find out in a month on his 
own or through the architect that the contractor was engaged in redesigns and causing delay. 
R. 8584, p. 114. 
On August 4,1998, Watts Corp generated a memo scheduling the Grand Opening for 
October 17, 1998 (Ex. 76). Larsen testified that they reasonably could have been finished 
by October 17th if "they" would have stopped the redesigns. R. 8585, pp. 195-196. Watts 
Corp generated subsequent memos scheduling the Grand Opening date for mid-November, 
1998, then January, 1999 (Exs. 46, 47). The Grand Opening was delayed by (1) items such 
as landscape and patios and furniture for the model, and (2) by the holidays as Watts and the 
Watts Group thought that was an unfavorable market time. R. 8585, p. 295,1.3-15; R. 8588, 
p. 900,1. 12-17. 
In his October 26, 1998 report, the Bank's architect, who regularly inspected the 
Project, stated that the Project's completion was under the estimated completion by 
approximately 7% and recommended that the funding of the payment application be held 
until the bank was satisfied that all conditions of the agreements had been met (Ex. 685 at 
Bates nos. 200372-200376). At that time, Stevensen was given the 10/30/98 Proforma that 
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set out hard construction costs of $6.9 million (an increase from the 10/21/97 Proforma and 
more than the Bank Loan) and projected net profit of $820,500/ Exs. 22, 23 (A.D-5). R. 
8585, p. 255,1. 13-18; R.8587, pp. 634-635. By October 30, 1998, none of the units had 
been placed under contract or closed (A.D-11 at Ex. 8). By October 1998, Watts knew the 
Project was going to be running short of money from the Bank Loan before they had their 
first unit sold. R. 8586, p. 390,1. 3-16. Kesler testified that the October budget was $1.7 
million higher - a 20% increase. He said the loan by definition was not in balance and the 
borrower would have to contribute funds to keep it in balance (he didn't know if that was 
done). R. 8993, 8997. Watts' deposition was read explaining that he told the bank that they 
were doing additional, ongoing upgrades at their own expense. R. 8995 (1. 25, 1-2). The 
Bank may have learned about changes after the date of the changes in the proformas. R. 
8995-96. Watts Corp funded part of the construction costs over the Bank Loan and charged 
interest on those funds. R. 8585, p. 299,1.20-23; Ex. 51; R. 8995 (1.25,1-2). Kesler opined 
that not providing proformas to the bank as changes were being made was not being 
forthright. R. 8998. Kesler opined that as costs increased, the projected sales prices 
increased, but the percentage of return went down. R. 8994. Watts agreed that the profit 
didn't really improve as costs went up. R. 8586, pp. 371-372. To Kesler, that showed more 
risk of getting a return because of a lower rate of return. R. 8994. Larsen also testified that 
as changes were made, costs increased, but the projected profit stayed the same and so he 
"believed" the profit projections were backed into. R. 8585, p. 166,1. 13-20. 
The Project was not substantially complete by October or November, 1998 which 
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Larsen attributed to the changes. R. 8584, p. 92,1. 7-10, p. I l l , 1.23-25, p. 112,1. 1. Larsen 
opined that Watts breached his duty of loyalty by failing to enforce the completion time in 
the Construction Contract. R. 8585, p. 184,1. 10-15. Watts agreed that the Construction 
Contract required substantial completion sufficient for the Grand Opening within 15 months. 
He agreed some delays occurred. R. 8586, pp. 516-517. The model was complete in 
November, 1998. R. 8586, p. 409,1. 1-4. 3rd East's counsel asked Watts when the model 
could have been completed but for the delays to which Watts responded he had no idea. R. 
8586, p. 409,1.18-21. Watts also testified that in October, November landscaping and finish 
work in the courtyard and lobby remained to be finished and that units were finished only 
to a sheetrock stage. R. 8585, p. 257,1. 17-22. 
About December 22,1998, Watts provided a punch list to Watts Corp insisting it get 
the items done quickly and indicating the Grand Opening was to be January 22 or 29. Ex. 
48; R. 8585, p. 295,1.16-23. At that point, windows and carpets needed to be cleaned, some 
furnishings were needed, and the wallpaper in the hallways was being completed. R. 8585, 
p. 296,1. 9-13. 
The Watts Group placed the first two units under contract in January, 1999. Ex. 728. 
The lobby and common areas were completed by February 1,1999. R. 8590, p. 1320,1. 6-8. 
Will Ward (the Project superintendent) testified that the delay in completing the lobby may 
have impacted sales. R. 8589, p. 1084,1. 1-8. The Grand Opening was held the weekend of 
February 5, 1999. R. 8585, p. 296,1. 14-18; R. 8586, p. 409,1. 9-11. As agreed, both the 
Watts Group and the Stevensen Group (Ted and Barbara Stevensen, and their son) worked 
SE \Liz\R Watts v StevenserMppellate Brief v lOwpd 27 
at the Project to sell units. A.D-1 §10.4. 
Larsen testified that after they were more than a year out, The Club slowed down 
because of the market and they didn't want to spend money because they didn't have money 
to spend. R. 8584, p. 104,1. 1-23. Watts agreed that the reason the Club ran out of money 
was because it had not borrowed enough to complete the Project and because of slow sales. 
R. 8586, p. 407,1.9-12. 
On or about March 9, 1999, Watts provided a memorandum to Stevensen informing 
him that Watts Corp would be funding another $322,000.00 to pay construction bills. R. 
8585, 0. 299,1. 20-23; Ex. 51. On June 1, 1999, Stevensen and Watts Corp executed two 
Promissory Notes borrowing an additional $300,000 for The Club (A.D-8). That same day, 
Watts Corp executed three more Promissory Notes borrowing additional funds for The Club 
(A.D-9). That same month, the Bank granted its first of four extensions of the Bank Loan 
(A.D-11 at Ex. 6 therein). RKW also made additional loans to The Club. A.D-1 (§ 6.1); A-
D.12 at Ex. 2, 793). RKW 94, another entity affiliated with Watts, also made loans to The 
Club. A.D-11 at Ex. 2. 
By the end of July, 1999, the Watts Group closed on 13 units with 34 units left to sell. 
A.D-11 at Ex. 8. Watts testified that at that time there were some items of construction 
remaining that did not relate to individual units. R. 8586, p. 385,1. 6-9. In July, 1999, the 
city issued a Certificate of Occupancy. R. 8584, p. 92,1. 22-25. As of September 2, 1999, 
31 units were not sold (A.D-11 at Ex. 8) and as of September 5, 1999, the projected total 
costs of the Project were $9,624,350, with net sales income (gross sales minus closing costs 
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and commissions) of $9,677,985. Watts sent Stevensen the 9/5/99 Proforma to that effect. 
Ex. 24 (A.D-5). 
As of September 11, 1999, the outstanding balance of the Bank Loan was 
$2,349,200.45 (A.D-11 at Ex. 6). The total debt of The Club was $3,600,000. R. 8590, p. 
1254,1. 18-25, p. 1255,1. 1-11. Stevensen and Watts had a meeting, about the reasons for 
the reduction in projected profit to plus or minus $50,000. Stevensen said that Watts told 
him it worked out that way. R. 8587, p. 630,1. 5-11. Stevensen claimed Watts fired him and 
he left the Project. R. 8587, p. 631, 1. 12-13. Watts ceased making payments (the 1% 
commission11 and $5,000 per month advance against profits12) to 3rd East. See also R. 8585, 
p. 315,1. 16-23. The stipulated accounting gave 3rd East a credit for the commissions of 
$53,242. A.D-11,12. 
After obtaining four extensions, the Bank Loan was paid off about June 15, 2000. 
A.D-11 at Ex. 6. The Club closed the sale of its last unit November 3, 2002. A.D-11 at Ex. 
8. Larsen said he believed the construction could have been completed but for the redesigns 
or the absence of the Architect within the projected 11 months, that the initial schedule 
seemed reasonable to him. R. 8585, p. 128,1.14-24. Kesler testified that higher priced units 
were selling faster in 1997. In 1998 higher priced units were selling slower. R. 8997, 8998. 
11
 The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of 3rd East and against The 
Club for failure to pay the 1% commission. R. 4018-4045 at 4027. 
12
 Counsel for 3rd East indicated to the trial court that the failure to pay the $5,000 
a month draw was not a part of 3rd East's claim for breach of fiduciary duty or as a 
contract claim. R. 8587, p. 686,1. 1-9, p. 738,1. 19-25; R. 8587. 
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That was consistent with the projections of the Appraisal. R. 8998. 
Larsen testified that "the result of Watts' decisions - and he was motivated to making 
these decisions by what may benefit Watts Corporation aside from The Club." R. 8585, p. 
186,1. 4-7. Larsen testified that he didn't know if he would have charged himself interest. 
R. 8584, p. 110,1. 15. Larsen opined that Watts permitted Watts Corp to breach Section 3.1 
of the Construction Contract (which requires the contractor to further the interests of the 
owner) because the interests of the Owner to make a profit were furthered. A.D-2; R. 8584, 
p. 89-92; R. 8585, p. 184,1. 10-22. 
Stevensen testified that Watts told him one of the reasons for increased costs were the 
marketing expenses. R. 8587, p. 630,1. 8-11. 
The Fee, referenced in Section 4.1 of the Operating Agreement, payable to RKW was 
booked in 2000 and reflected upon the capital account in the fmancials of The Club with 
RKW's capital account increasing by $451,000.13 R. 8589, p. 1148,1. 5-25; p. 1149,1. 1-2; 
A.D-1. In response to a notation found on a document not entered into evidence (Exhibit 396 
[sic 663]), Deane Smith testified that The Club was booking the Fee December 31,2001 and 
then expensing it in 2002 (3rd East claimed this was evidence of double booking in two years 
[see Issue 4.2(F)]). R.8589, p. 1149,1. 24-25; pg 1150,1. 1-8. 
3 rd East did not receive $469,000 of its original capital contribution. Ex. 793; Ex. 796; 
13
 Whether or not the Fee should have been booked to the capital account of RKW 
was resolved by the jury. The jury determined that booking the $451,000 to the capital 
account of RKW was a breach of the Operating Agreement, but it was waived by the 
defenses of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel. R. 8191. 
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R. 8589, p. 1137,1. 18-21. 
4.2 The Verdict of Gross Negligence/Willful Misconduct by Watts is not Supported 
by Substantial Evidence. Jury verdicts may be overturned if, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, there is no substantial evidence to support it. Canyon, 
781 P.2d at 417; Billings, 918 P.2d at 467. Substantial evidence exists when the factual 
findings support more than a mere scintilla of the evidence, though something less than the 
weight of the evidence. Martinez, 2007 UT at [^35. Because the Operating Agreement 
authorized self-dealing by Watts, 3rd East bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Watts breached his fiduciary duty to it with conduct amounting to gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. SeeR. 7133-38. See also Jury Inst. 46, R. 8166. The jury 
was instructed as to gross negligence (see Jury Inst. 34, R. 8454), in summary, the failure to 
show even slight care. The jury was also instructed as to willful misconduct (see Jury Inst. 
35, R. 8155) as: 
the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do an act, in reckless 
disregard of the consequences, and under such circumstances and conditions 
that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know, that such 
conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to another. 
3rd East failed to meet its burden. 
A. A Finding of No Breach of Contract Precludes a Finding of Gross Negligence. 
The jury found that The Club did not breach Section 4.1 of the Operating Agreement, which 
required 3rd East's approval to change the scope, nature, and budget of the Project. R. 8188.14 
14
 The jury did find that The Club breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
(R.8192), but as a matter of law it could not have found that failing to obtain approvals 
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If The Club did not breach Section 4.1, then its Manager, Watts, did not breach it or his 
duties. Consequently, the Verdict against Watts cannot be based upon changes to the scope, 
nature, or budget of the Project. 
The majority of 3rd East's theories of liability, including extensions of time, increased 
budgets, failure to attach budgets, failure to require architect supervision, and choice of the 
type of Project, all boil down to an argument that changes equal costs and time resulting in 
losses. Increasing the hard or soft costs of the proformas (A.D-5 which Stevensen 
understood to mean a prediction or hope (R. 8587, p. 697,1. 8-12, 20)) could not constitute 
breach of fiduciary duty as the jury found such was not a breach of the Operating Agreement. 
R. 8188. 
B. Watts Had No Duty to Keep 3rd East Informed. In addition to increased costs, 3rd 
East theorized that Watts breached his fiduciary duty by failing to keep it informed. 3rd East's 
theory is without legal merit. The Utah Limited Liability Act (the "Act") and the Operating 
Agreement do not impose upon the Manager a duty to inform members regarding the status 
of the company. Under the terms of the Act, an LLC was to keep certain books and records 
at its principal place of business. Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-l 19 (1996). Such records are 
was the basis for that breach. It is axiomatic in the law, and the jury was so instructed, 
that a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot be based on exactly the 
same acts which could form the basis for breach of express contract covenants. Jury Inst. 
44, R. 8164. USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing. Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 439 (C.A. 3 1993) (stating 
there is no implied covenant for matters specifically covered by the written contract). 
Furthermore, Section 4.1 imposed limitations on the changes (i.e. Stevensen's approval) 
and therefore, the duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot expand or alter those terms. 
Markham v. Bradley. 2007 UT App 379, ^21, 173 P.3d 865, 872; Anapoell v. American 
Express Business Fin. Corp., 2008 WL 2225849, *6 (D. Utah). 
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usubject to inspection and copying at the reasonable request and at the expense of any 
member during ordinary business hours." Id. at §48-2b-l 19(2). In addition, the Operating 
Agreement required (1) the establishment of capital and drawing accounts, and (2) changes 
in the budget by approval (again, the jury found no breach). A.D-1, §§4.1, 7.1 and 7.2. It 
is undisputed that before Stevensen left the Project in September 1999 (for whatever reason) 
he never made a request to review the books and records.15 When Stevensen did finally 
make the requests after September 1999, records were provided to him and he was told that 
the books and records were available. R. 8586, p. 490,1. 10-15; A.D-10; Ex. 610. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the Act which imposes a duty upon the member to request 
specific records if desired, the jury was instructed that under the law of fiduciary duty, a 
manager has an obligation to make a true and full disclosure of "all information" affecting 
the affairs of the company if the information is relevant and material to the manager's 
dealings with the member. Jury Inst. 49, R. 8170. Even if this obligation is imposed upon 
the manager by virtue of the Operating Agreement its only application would be to provide 
true disclosure to obtain 3rd East's approval for increases in the budget. The Operating 
Agreement imposed no other disclosure obligation upon Watts. On this issue the jury found 
15
 R. 8587, p. 30,1. 24-25 (Stevensen testified that he never quizzed or questioned 
anyone.); R. 8589, p. 955,1. 3-5, p. 1016,1. 4-16, p. 1053,1. 11-17 (Watts Corp office 
manager testifying that she met with Stevensen once a month to give him his draw, but he 
never asked for any information); R. 8586, p. 489,1. 24-25, p. 490,1. 1-9 (Watts testifying 
that he provided information to Stevensen and Stevensen never asked for anything more. 
If he had, Watts would have given it to him.); R. 8586, p. 490,1. 20-24 (Watts never 
denied Stevensen information); R. 8590, p. 1238,1. 22-25, p. 1239,1. 1-6 (Watts testifying 
that Stevensen never asked for budgeting updates.). 
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no breach. R. 8188. 
Furthermore, even if Watts had a duty of disclosure, it was met as a matter of law as 
the information was available to 3rd East for its review. The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that where a partner has full access to partnership records, as is his right, then a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds of affirmatively failing to disclose information 
cannot be sustained. Burke v. Farrell 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1972) (citing Utah Code 
Ann. §48-1-16). See also Walter v. Holiday Inns. Inc.. 784 F. Supp. 1159, 1171 (U.S. Dist. 
Ct. N.J. 1992) (directed verdict would be proper on breach of fiduciary duty claim where 
plaintiffs had access to the company's books and records). Furthermore, when partners or 
members are given projections as to future valuations and the partner or member has the right 
to review the information to make future valuations there is no breach of fiduciary duty. 
Walter, 748 F. Supp. at 1171. 
As in Burke, 3rd East had the right to request available information regarding the 
company. See Utah Code Ann. §48-2b-119 (1996). There is no testimony by Stevensen 
claiming that he asked for information and it was refused! Stevensen attended coordination 
meetings. He knew when and where they were being held and was only asked to leave once 
due to unrelated business. R. 8587, p. 646,1. 15-25, p. 647,1. 1-9, p. 615,1. 6-25, p. 649,1. 
9-11, p. 1053,1. 11-17. Stevensen himself testified that he didn't quiz or question anyone. 
R. 8587, p. 30,1.24-25. Stevensen signed or initialed documents without ever reading them, 
he threw documents away and he wasn't concerned about costs. R. 8587, p. 636,1. 2-10, p. 
716,1. 13-19, 22-25, p. 703,1. 12-20, p. 705,1. 15-22, p. 706,1. 15-22, p. 717,1. 1-4, p. 723, 
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1. 22-25, p. 724. 
Backing Into Profit Projection. Larsen testified that he believed Watts backed into 
his profit projections as the profits remained the same even though costs increased. Watts 
agreed that the profit projections remained the same as costs increased and Kesler testified 
that the profit margin decreased as costs increased. However, 3 rd East did not present any 
testimony of any unnecessary changes. Nor did any of 3rd East's witnesses opine as to 
whether or not the projected unit prices were accurate or even reasonable based upon the 
changes. Larsen admitted that he did not have any opinion as to what the sales prices should 
have been for the units as he was not a real estate expert and had no opinion regarding the 
market. R. 8584, p. 79, 1. 15-16; R. 8585, p. 205, 1. 12-15. Larsen's testimony was 
speculation. Experts are not permitted to speculate. Thurston, 2003 UT App. at ^ 20. 
C. Larsen's Opinion Was Based on Several Obvious Errors of Fact. Where an 
expert's opinion is obviously false it is not substantial evidence and will not support a jury 
verdict. United States v. Hill 62 F.2d 1022, 1025 (C.A. 8 1933). 
Architect not overseeing the construction. The evidence established that not only did 
Dazely oversee the Project for the Architect, but so did an independent architect for the Bank. 
R. 8590, p. 1298,1. 21-23; R. 8585, p. 250,1. 25, p. 251,1. 1; R. 8586, p. 491,1. 25, p. 492, 
1. 1-4, p. 493,1. 23-25, p. 494,1. 1, p. 513,1. 1-9, p. 515,1. 10-23; R. 8588, p. 987,1. 16-18. 
Larsen testified he did not know who Dazely was although he admitted to seeing his name 
as attending the coordination meetings. R. 8585, p. 169,1.1-4. Dazely5s presence is reflected 
in at least half of the Club Coordination Meeting Minutes admitted into evidence. See Ex. 
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552. 
No Daily Reports: Despite claiming to have reviewed 30 boxes of documents, Larsen 
testified that he did not see any Daily Reports in the construction records and that showed 
a lack of care by the contractor. R. 8584, p. 94,1. 1-5, p. 112,1. 14-25. The Daily Reports 
(consisting of 238 pages) were introduced into evidence. See Ex. 488. 
Architect Not Reviewing Shop Drawings: Correspondence regarding Dazely' s review 
and involvement with shop drawings was discussed and introduced at trial. R. 8585, p. 168, 
1. 14-25, p. 169,1. 1-4. 
Not Pushing Subcontractors to Perform: Larsen opined that he did not see any 
evidence that the contractor was pushing subs to perform. 3rd East's own counsel later 
caused a memorandum to be admitted into evidence from Watts Corp to a subcontractor 
demanding that he perform work and threatening to backcharge him if he does not perform. 
Ex. 42; R. 8585, p. 285,1. 9-25, p. 286,1. 1-25, p. 287,1. 1-18. 
D. Larsen's Testimony Was Based in Large Part Upon Speculation and Nonsense. 
Experts are not permitted to speculate. Thurston, 2003 UT App at f 20; Goebel, 215 
F. 3d at 1087. Furthermore, expert testimony will not support a verdict if it is nonsense. 
Hill, 62 F.2d at 1025. 
Delay = Damage: Larsen opined that Watts breached his fiduciary duty by not causing 
the Project to be completed in its entirety sooner, if it had, The Club could have decreased 
its interest obligations to the Bank. He opined: The faster you finish the more money you 
make, the shorter your loan is to the bank because interest typically will decrease once 
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construction is finished. R. 8584, p. 112, 1. 8-11. Larsen agreed that his opinion was 
contingent upon buyers being available to buy the units. However, Larsen did not know if 
there were any buyers in the marketplace to purchase the units at any earlier date such that 
the interest costs could be cut off. R. 8585, p. 160,1.23-25, p. 161,1. 1-12. His opinion that 
interest could have decreased was pure speculation. 
Furthermore, Watts explained that they/he made the business decision to wait for a 
buyer before they completed the finishes in a unit so they didn't borrow money and have to 
pay interest on that money too. R. 8586, p. 385,1. 2-5; R. 8590, p. 1253,1. 13-16, p. 1316, 
1. 15-25, p. 1317,1. 1-9, p. 1318,1. 12-13. p. 1270, 1. 25, p. 1271, 1. 1-3. The jury was 
instructed that when exercising business judgment, a manager may make mistakes and that 
is not gross negligence or willful misconduct. See Jury Inst. 51, R. 8172. Logically, if more 
money had been spent to finish the units without buyers, then more interest would have been 
incurred as they waited for buyers. It is undisputed that it took more than three years to sell 
out the Project. A-D-l 1 at Ex. 8. Watts' business decision based on sound logic and made 
with the intention to save money cannot be the basis for a finding of breach of fiduciary duty. 
However, Larsen opined that the solution was to finish all the units, whether or not 
there were buyers, and get a new loan. R. 8585, p. 161,1. 13-25, p. 162,1.1-23. A new loan 
would carry its own interest. No evidence was presented that a new loan could have been 
obtained at a lower rate. That was simply an opinion based upon "nonsense clothed in words 
of 'learned length'". Hill, 62 F.2d at 1025. 
Changes by the Contractor: Larsen testified that Watts Corp as the contractor was 
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permitted to make constant changes to the Project with no controls by the Architect 
reviewing costs contrary to the industry standards. He likened it to a contractor making 
changes while building your house without your knowledge. However, each change initiated 
by Watts was a change initiated by the owner. When changes were made, the owner knew. 
The jury found no breach on this issue. Larsen's testimony was nonsense. Hill 62 F.2d at 
1025. 
Costs for Faulty Construction. Larsen opined that the absence of the Architect's 
oversight of the construction may have caused The Club to pay for faulty construction. He 
could not identify any but said it was likely there was some. R. 8584, p. 94,1. 7-9. Again, 
speculation. 
Delay Caused by Changes: The Construction Contract permitted extensions of time 
due to owners changes. A.D-2 at §42. Therefore, any delay because of changes was agreed 
to (again the changes, which increased costs, were approved). 
Failure to Attach Documents to the Construction Contract: Watts explained without 
challenge that the documents referenced in Section 16.1.7 and not attached to the 
Construction Contract did not exist because they were still working on bidding and pricing 
at that time. R. 8590, p. 1215,1. 16-25, p. 1216,1. 1. Furthermore, Stevensen signed the 
Construction Contract on behalf of The Club. As the Owner's representative, Stevensen also 
had duties to act for the Owner in matters relative to the execution of the Construction 
Contract. Larsen testified that it would have been wise for Stevensen to insure that exhibits 
were attached to the Construction Contract. R. 8585, p. 198, 1. 13-25, p. 199, 1. 1, 6-11. 
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Therefore, the failure is attributable to 3rd East, not just Watts. 
Increasing Costs to Benefit Watts Corp. Larsen did not think Watts' motivation was 
to increase payments to Watts Corp (that was simply the result of his actions). R. 8585, p. 
151,1.9-11. He testified that Watts' intent was to create a monument or to create value for 
potential buyers. Larsen relied on Watts' deposition testimony that he hoped Watts Corp had 
a good reputation and his intent was to create the best product that he could for the 
marketplace. It is undisputed that the purpose of the Project was to create a product to sell 
for profit. Wattsf entity, RKW, was a 50% owner of The Club. As such, RKW would be 
entitled to 50% of the profits. It is simply illogical to assert that Watts would increase costs 
to make 8% on a Construction Contract (and even that 8% was dependent upon sales R. 
8586, p. 505,1. 20-23) when he, via his entity, RKW, could receive more from 50% of the 
profits.16 
Borrowing Less Money from the Bank: There is absolutely no evidence that the plan 
to borrow less money from the Bank was gross negligence or willful misconduct. Watts 
testified without challenge that borrowing money from private lenders actually saved The 
Club money on extension fees and closing costs. R. 8586, p. 399,1. 4-11; p. 480,1. 7-25; p. 
481, 1. 1-10. This testimony was undisputed and ratified by Kesler who opined that the 
decision to borrow less money from the bank was a good decision on the part of the 
developer as a cost saving measure. R. 8998. Acting to save The Club money is the exercise 
16
 Mathematically Watts would have to increase the construction costs by 
$5,000,000 to obtain an equal projected profit of $400,000 as a 50% member. 
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of care. In addition, the plan was the exercise of business judgment which the jury was 
instructed that Watts may make even if he falls into mistake (which he did not). Jury Inst. 
51, R. 8172. 
Watts' Failure to Cause The Club to Pay 3rd East for land, profit and 1% fee. 
Managing the cash flow of The Club under circumstances where the profitability of the 
Project was in question is one of the key responsibilities of the Manager. The Act provided 
a statutory prohibition against making distributions to Members if after giving effect to the 
distribution, the fair value of The Club's assets would be less than the total liabilities of the 
Company. §48-2b-128 (A.A-2). The undisputed evidence was that in September 1999 a 
minimal profit of $50,000 or possibly a loss of $50,000 was projected. A.D-5 (Ex. 24). 3rd 
East's share was plus or minus $25,000. As of September, 3rd East had already received 
distributions against profits of $162,000. Watts knew that 3rd East had no means to repay 
further distributions. R.8586, p. 425,1. 8-22. Watts knew that he had an obligation to pay 
creditors first before he paid members. R. 8586, p. 507,1.15-25. See also A.D-14 (members 
agreeing to pay profits last). Therefore, it would have been imprudent and probably a 
violation of law to make further distributions to 3rd East. Obviously, the booking of a entry 
in a budget or for that matter evidence of equity within a capital account (due to the 
contribution of land) is not evidence of the availability of actual funds for payment. The 
evidence before the Court is that at all times during construction and until the sale of the last 
Unit, The Club's assets were primarily unsold condominium units which do not equate to 
available funds for distributions. The Deane Smith Accounting prepared at the conclusion 
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of the Project demonstrated that after giving 3rd East credit for all distributions and the 1% 
commissions, 3rd East was in fact over-disbursed. A.D-11,12. This evidence confirms not 
only the absence of gross negligence by Watts, but that his conduct was prudent. 
Because of the need to sell and close 3 lunits which were unfinished it was necessary 
to spend money to market the units, to pay interest upon the Company loans, and to finish the 
units to conditions which would permit the sale of the units. To freeze the Project in 
September in its incomplete status is 3rd East's attempt to second guess the business 
judgment of Watts whose decisions ultimately resulted in the sale of all units. To argue that 
further changes, if any, should not have been made at this point in time is not supported by 
anything but speculation. Again, there is no testimony of unnecessary costs or changes. To 
be sure, there is a complete absence of proof of Watts' indifference or the absence of even 
the slightest care. As Larsen himself stated, they weren't throwing money away. R. 8584, 
p. 109,1. 6-11, 13-16. The intent of any redesign or changes was to create more value for a 
prospective buyer. R. 8585, p. 207, 1. 9-15. Watts' intent evidences the interests of the 
owners of pleasing the customers so that sales could be made. See also R. 8586, p. 370,1. 
7-16. Larsen simply testified that he did not see any evidence that an investigation was made 
to ensure that the sales prices would increase proportionately to the cost increases, but again 
he could not testify regarding sales prices as he was not an expert. R. 8584, p. 108,1.18-25; 
R. 8585, p. 206,1.5-15. 
E. The Manager may rely upon experts and be fully protected from his actions. A 
Manager may rely upon experts and be fully protected. Jury Inst. 52., R. 8173. 
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Withholding Payments: It is evident that based upon the letter from counsel to 
Stevensen on October 1999 (A.D-10), Watts was relying upon the advice of counsel, an 
expert, in withholding payments to 3rd East. Consequently, Watts, actions are fully protected 
from personal liability. In addition, based upon the facts in September, 1999, Watts was 
acting in accordance with the Act. 
Watts' disagreement with the Appraisal. Watts was free to disagree with other 
members of the builder and real estate community and doing so is not engaging in gross 
negligence or willful misconduct. Jury Inst. 51, R. 8172. The flaw in 3rd East's proof is clear 
in the evidence presented by Watts that he relied on his own expertise (and 3rd East stipulated 
that he had the expertise) and the expertise of his marketing team at the Watts Group. R. 
8586, pp. 404-06; R. 8588, pp. 819-20, 839, 866 and 867; R. 8590, pp. 1273-74. 
Furthermore, Watts' real estate expert, George Richards, testified that he felt The Club made 
the right design decision for the Salt Lake City marketplace at the time. R. 8588, p. 812,1. 
7-13. Based upon the foregoing testimony, Watts must, as a matter of law, be fully protected 
from liability. 
F. 3rd East theorized that the Fee was double booked into RKW's Capital Account. 
The evidence beyond 3rd East's mere speculation conclusively establishes the Fee was 
booked only once. See A.D-11 at p. 1; R. 6966-75. 
If the capital account would have been credited twice in the amount of $451,000, as 
3 rd East argued, the total capital account of RKW at the conclusion of year 2002 would have 
been $1,368,380 ($917,380 + $451,000) and not $917,380. A.D-11 (p. 2 of Ex. 2 therein). 
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The stipulated Smith accounting shows incremental increases in RKW's capital account 
totaling $325,380 in calendar years 1997,1998 and 1999; adding these incremental amounts 
to $902,000 (twice the Fee) would equal $ 1,227,380 even if the cash contributions from 1996 
are not considered. As reflected on the Smith accounting, RKW's capital account never 
exceeded $917,360. More importantly, no additions were made to RKW's capital account 
in calendar years 2001 or 2002, the years that 3rd East contends the double booking occurred. 
A.D-11 (p. 2 of Ex. 2). Of equal importance, Teuscher couldn't find even one booking of 
the Fee which was and is acknowledged in the stipulated accounting. A.D-11; R. 8587, p. 
587,1. 24-25, p. 588,1. 1-14. If two bookings existed, the probabilities are that Teuscher 
should have found at least one. 
3rd East merely confuses the issue of "booking" verses "expensing" the Fee. The 
financial statements of the Club (A.D-11, p. 2 of Ex. 2) show that "booking" the Fee (in other 
words entering it for the first time on the balance sheet) is necessarily a double entry. First, 
it was entered as a debit to assets ("Work in Process - Develop Fee") much like the land 
obtained from 3rd East was booked as an asset ("Work in Process- Land" see A.D-11 at Ex. 
2), and then it was entered as a credit to the capital account of RKW. 3rd East acknowledges 
that this occurred in the calendar year 2000 (although A.D-11 p. 2 of Ex. 2 (the summary) 
reflects that it occurred as early as 1996). R. 8590, p. 1366,1.12-24. The "expensing" of the 
Fee (in other words treating the Fee as an expense of the Project) occurred in the calendar 
year 2002. Id. First, the amount of the Fee ($451,000) was debited to the expenses of the 
Project (thus recognizing the Fee as an expense of the Project for profit and loss calculations) 
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and then the amount of the "Work in Process - Develop Fee" ($451,000) was credited to the 
asset category to remove it from assets. Basic accounting demonstrates that it is only 
booking the Fee that results in a credit to the capital account of RKW (again the summary 
of the Liddle & Waite financials (A.D-11, Ex. 2) does not reflect a double booking) and that 
expensing the Work in Process - Develop Fee has no impact at all on RKW's capital account. 
Consequently, there is no credible evidence that the Fee was booked twice to the capital 
account of RKW.17 
The evidence presented at trial, even viewed in a light most favorable to 3rd East does 
not support a finding of breach of fiduciary duty by gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
4.3 The Verdict is not Supported by Substantial Evidence that Any Misconduct was 
the Proximate Cause of Damages Beyond Mere Speculation. No matter what theories 3rd 
East may espouse and even if we assume for purposes of argument that Watts engaged in 
gross negligence or willful misconduct, the evidence did not establish beyond mere 
speculation that the conduct was the proximate cause of harm. Proximate cause may not be 
established by expert testimony that represents a mere guess or speculation, or worse, "I 
don't know." Thurston. 834 P.3d 397; Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598, 601 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Furthermore, expert testimony must not be contrary to the facts, based 
on insufficient data, or nonsense. Hill 62 F.2d at 1025. However, that is all 3rd East 
provided. To be sure, the theme of 3rd East's experts was "I don't know." 
17
 The jury found that The Club was excused from any breach in granting RKW a 
credit to its capital account for the Fee and the $180,000. Verdict, R.8191 (A.C-5). 
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3rd East's key expert, Larsen, testified that changes increase costs and cause delay. 
When asked what changes were made to the Project he was only able to identify one, but he 
did not know the effect of it, he only speculated that the change would not have been to save 
money. R. 8584, p. 96,1. 23-25, p. 97,1. 1-2; R. 8585, p. 155,1. 9-25, p. 156,1. 8-19.18 He 
was unable to identify any other changes. R. 8584, p. 97, 1. 2; R. 8585, p. 153, 1. 13-15. 
When asked whether changes were made to unit plans, floor plans, parking areas, or 
hallways, his response was "I don't know." R. 8585, p. 155,1. 18-25, p. 156,1. 1-7. He did 
testify that the total configuration of the building did not change after the plans were 
complete. R. 8585, p. 153,1. 15-16. 
One of the key aspects of Larsen's testimony was that he did not see any evidence of 
investigation of the value of changes. However, despite not being able to identify them, and 
admitting that the changes were intended to and did add value he said, "I'm not sure if they 
increased proportionately to the selling price." R. 8585, p. 206,1. 11-15 (emphasis added); 
R. 8587, p. 207,1. 4-15. Larsen admitted that he was not a real estate expert and could not 
opine as to the pricing of units. R. 8585, p. 160,1. 19-22; R. 8584, p. 79,1. 15-16. 
Further, Larsen did not know: (1) what changes were necessary or unnecessary (while 
admitting that some were necessary (R. 8585, p. 159, 1. 16-20)); (2) what costs were 
unnecessary (R. 8585, p. 159,1.21-25); (3) what specific changes added value to the Project 
(while admitting that some did (R. 8585, p. 160, 1. 4-7)); or (4) what changes may have 
18
 Dazely, however, established that the change to the mechanical vents system 
was a necessary change that saved money. R. 8588, p. 924,1. 17-25, p. 925,1. 1. 
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resulted in a sale (R. 8585, p. 160,1. 15-18). 
Larsen suggested the possibility of unnecessary costs by opining that because the 
Architect did not conduct site visits (an opinion against the clear weight of evidence) there 
were no reports of faulty construction for which the contractor should not be paid. Larsen 
stated that he could not identify any faulty construction, but it is likely there was some. R. 
8584, p. 93,1. 4-25, p. 94,1. 1-18. Again, that was speculation. 
Not only did he not know of the unnecessary changes, but Larsenfs opinion was not 
grounded in facts. He based his opinion that there were unnecessary changes upon two 
passages from Watts' deposition testimony. The first was that Watts was building to the 
marketplace and he hoped Watts Corp had a good reputation. R. 8585, p. 150,1.2-25, p. 151, 
1. 1. The second was that construction took longer because of the finishes (while ignoring 
the remainder of his answer that they would not finish individual units until they found a 
buyer). R. 8590, p. 1319,1.4-22. However, neither of those passages conveyed information 
pertaining to unnecessary changes, but rather that changes were made in order to sell units. 
R. 8586, p. 515,1. 24-25, p. 516,1. 1-11. Likewise, Watts' trial testimony explaining the 
remainder of his deposition answer did not reference unnecessary changes, but just the 
opposite. R. 8590, p. 1316,1. 25, p. 1317,1. 1-19. 
Not being able to identify any specific changes, Larsen simply said that all he had was 
the end result of the changes "There was an increase and extend[sic] the duration of 
performance which Mr. Watts said resulted from the changes." R. 8585, p. 153,1.25; p. 154, 
1. 1-2. Again Watts5 complete answer was there was delay because of the finishes and that 
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they were not completing the finishes in individual units until they found a buyer. 
When asked when the Project could have been completed but for the changes (that he 
was unable to identify or opine as to whether they were necessary or unnecessary) and the 
absence of the architect, Larsen speculated: 
A I believe that the Watts Corporation could have completed it within in 
the 11 months had there been no changes. I believe there (inaudible) 
performance where the Watts Corporation anticipated completion by a certain 
date. They were months off. Pve not made an independent time analysis. All 
I can recall is the representations made by the Watts Corporation which 
seemed reasonable to me. 
R. 8585, p. 128,1. 14-24. He had no idea. He simply based his opinion on a preliminary 
schedule generated by Watts Corp before construction even started.19 
3rd East's other experts were similarly deficient. Teuscher did not have any opinion 
whether the actual costs incurred to build were or were not necessary. R. 8587, p. 596,1.14-
17. He did not have any opinion whether or not the actual costs were incurred in order to sell 
the units. R. 8587, p. 596,1. 18-21. He did not have any opinion whether or not additional 
interest and finance costs incurred versus the projected interest and finance costs were 
necessarily incurred. R. 8587, p. 600,1. 24-25, p. 601,1. 1-6. Likewise Kesler did not have 
any opinion regarding the changes other than that changes in the construction budget resulted 
in the loan being out of balance, but again he didn't know if that problem had been cured 
although he did know that the Bank did not foreclose. R. 8993-94. Furthermore, Watts1 
testimony that borrowing funds from private lenders versus borrowing funds from the Bank 
19
 Referring to Ex. 41. But see A.D-2 and Larsen's admission that it was 
acceptable to give themselves 15 months in the contract. R. 8584, p. 91,1. 2-13. 
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saved The Club money, was uncontested. R. 8586, p. 399,1.4-11; p. 480,1. 7-25; p. 481,1. 
1-10. Kesler in fact agreed that borrowing less money was good decision as a cost saving 
measure on the part of the developer, just not for the bank. R. 8998. 
Causes for Delay other than Changes: Larsen admitted that there were intervening 
causes. He admitted that delay resulted from the market. R. 8584, p. 105,1.1-5. Larsen also 
opined that the construction slowed because they didn't want to spend money because they 
didn't have money to spend. R. 8584, p. 104,1. 17-23. However, Larsen could not assign a 
percentage of causation to either. R. 8584, p. 105,1. 6-11. 
Furthermore, the claims that they didn't have money to spend was the proximate cause 
of delay is simply nonsensical and not supported by the evidence. The evidence established 
that The Club borrowed additional funds as needed. A.D-6, 8,9,11 at Ex. 2 therein, and Ex. 
793. 
3rd East attempted to argue, without any proof, that the Project caused the slow-down 
in the market; however, in response to such questioning Watts' real estate expert (3rd East did 
not present their own expert), Richards, testified that was not likely and impossible to 
quantify. R. 8588, p. 795,1.2-5. Stevensen himself admitted that he had no idea what caused 
the slow sales market. R. 8587, p. 673,1. 9-14. 
Watts established that there were other causes of delay. For example, Watts 
established that the Project suffered weather delays. R. 8586, p. 381,1. 11-18; R. 8590, p. 
1216,1. 23-25, p. 1217,1. 1-19. Mr. Ward (the Project manager) testified that he kept track 
of weather delays in the Daily Project Reports (Ex. 488). Mr. Ward testified that 
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conservatively there could have been at least 14 V2 days where work could not be performed 
because of weather. One lost day could equate to weeks of delay. Weather is beyond the 
control of the contractor. R. 8589, p. 1085,1.2-13, p. 1067,1.10-25, p. 1068,1.1-25, p. 1069, 
1. 1-9; Ex. 488. 
Bob Whitney of the Watts Group opined that the Stevensen Group's inability to sell 
contributed to the slow sales and probably had a twelve-month impact on the sales. R. 8588, 
p. 876,1. 15-25. Where a party has contributed to delay, they are not entitled to recover 
damages for the delay. Higgins v. City of Fillmore. 639 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1981). 
Larsen's criticism of items that differed from an arms-length transaction. Larsen 
criticized certain aspects of the transaction that differed from a typical arms-length 
transaction. But none of the issues that he identified was the proximate cause of any harm. 
(1) Low Liability Limits in Architect's Contract (A.D-3): No evidence of any claims made 
for faulty design or construction against the Architect. Am. Comp. (A.C-1). (2) Architect's 
Failure to Review Shop Drawings: Watts produced evidence that the Architect did in fact 
review shop drawings. R. 8585, p. 168, 1. 14-25, p. 169, 1. 1-4. Moreover, there was no 
evidence regarding any damage for this failure even if it did occur and therefore no proof of 
proximate cause of an harm. (3) Architect's Failure to Provide Certificate of Final Payment: 
It is the banker that wants the Certificate of Final Payment. R. 8588, p. 949, 1. 3-5. No 
claims have been made by the Bank. (4) Architect's Failure to Review Construction Draws: 
A lot of provisions in the Architect's contract are for inexperienced owners (such as 
reviewing draw requests), and if services are requested, the costs to the owner would 
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increase. R. 8588, p. 943,1.15-22, p. 988,1.2-15. 3rd East's counsel acknowledged that The 
Club' s representative was not inexperienced when he stated: "In this case we have a situation 
more like that, don't we, because Russell Watts as the owner of The Club Condominiums LC 
or as acting as the manager of the owner, he knows a lot about construction and Russell 
Watts acting as president of Watts Corporation knows a lot about construction and in fact all 
the work that has been done by Watts Corporation is known to Mr. Watts as both president 
of the company and the manager of the condominiums." R. 8588, p. 943,1. 23-25, p. 944, 
1. 1-5. Similarly, the Architect opined that Watts, the representative of The Club and Watts 
Corp was capable of reviewing the construction draws and that had he reviewed the draws 
he would have charged his time therefore adding to the costs of the Project. R. 8588, p. 927, 
1. 10-23. Larsen opined that the failure of the Architect to oversee the draws permitted the 
contractor to make changes. This opinion is irrelevant to this transaction. In this transaction, 
Watts acted on behalf of Watts Corp and on behalf of The Club as its manager when he 
reviewed the draw requests. Obviously, the owner, The Club, by its agent, Watts, is informed 
with every draw request. Furthermore, the jury found that there was no breach for making 
the changes. 
3rd East completely failed to prove the amount of the damage beyond mere 
speculation. See Issue No. 2. Where the amount of the damage is left to speculation a 
damage award is not appropriate. Atkm, 709 p.2d at 336-37. To begin to quantify damages 
for delay there needed to be an opinion as to when the Project could be completed. Larsen 
could only speculate. Larsen simply opined that the entire Project should have been 
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completed faster because the faster you finish the more money you make, the shorter your 
loan is to the bank because interest typically will decrease once construction is finished. R. 
8584, p. 112,1. 8-11. Larsen admitted that 3rd East's premise that the Project should have 
been finished faster presupposed that there was a buyer to buy the units at that time. R. 8585, 
p. 160,1.23-25, p. 161,1.1-2. However, Larsen did not know if there were any buyers in the 
marketplace to purchase the units at any earlier date such that the interest costs could be cut 
off. R. 8585, p. 160,1. 23-25, p. 161,1. 1-12. His opinion was again "I don't know." With 
respect to the decision not to finish units until they found a buyer, Larsen opined that they 
should have finished all the units, whether or not there were buyers, and get a new loan. R. 
8585, p. 161,1. 13-25, p. 162,1. 1-23. However, no testimony was provided that The Club 
could have saved money with a better interest rate. To be sure when questioned as to 
whether a new loan would also bear interest he simply stated that he was not an expert in the 
banking industry. The undisputed evidence established that even when the units were on the 
market it still took until November 2002 to sell out the Project. A.D-11 at Ex. 8; R. 8590, 
p. 1317,1.10-16. It is a matter of common sense that had The Club spent the money to finish 
out all of the units and then still had to wait the proven 48 months to sell the units that the 
interests costs would have been higher. There is NO EVIDENCE that the outcome would 
have been different if the units had all been completed and available earlier. Rather the 
evidence at trial established that The Club could have turned out like the other projects that 
came on the market at that time, in the same price range, that went into foreclosure, or still 
had units to sell in 2007. R. 8588, p. 786,1. 21-25, p. 787,1. 1-14, p. 871,1. 7-19. Therefore, 
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had The Club spend all the money up front the situation, could have been worse. 
3 rd East's economic expert, Teuscher, did not provide any helpful testimony. He did 
not opine regarding lost sales. Teuscher testified that he was not a real estate expert and did 
not have an opinion as to whether or not the real estate market was difficult during the sales 
period. R. 8587, p. 596, 1. 22-25, p. 597, 1. 1-3. He did not have an opinion as to the 
adequacy of sales prices of the units. R. 8587, p. 597,1. 11-15. He did not provide any 
calculations for delay costs. R. 8587, p. 597,1. 21-25. He had no opinion as to whether or 
not construction costs or administrative costs were necessarily incurred or not. R. 8587, p. 
589,1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24. 
Teuscher provided two damage scenarios, but did not, however, provide objective 
facts, figures and data required for the jury to establish damages in the form of lost net profits 
under the law. Ex. 97 (A.D-7). In each analysis, Teuscher accepted the net revenue (gross 
sales minus closing costs) and the value of the land from the stipulated accounting. R. 8587, 
p. 585, 1. 25, p. 586, 1. 1-4. He then testified that the jury could look to the actual 
construction costs20 and the actual administrative and other costs21 to determine what costs 
were necessarily incurred or not, but did not provide an opinion as to either. R. 8587, p. 589, 
1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24. While a true statement, there was no evidence for the jury to 
determine what costs were unnecessary, or what sales were lost or could have been had 
20
 A.D-7 at Ex. C. Note the financial expert indicated that all costs below the 
construction costs on Exhibit C were not adjustable although he excluded some without 
explanation. R. 8587, p. 589,1. 14-22. 
21
 A.D-7 at Ex. D. 
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(an issue upon which he did not have an opinion).22 R. 8587, p. 596,1. 14-25, p. 597,1. 1-3, 
11-15, p. 600, 1. 24-25, p. 601,1. 1-6, p. 601,1. 17-24. He did not have an opinion as to 
whether the sales prices of the units were appropriate or adequate. R. 8587, p. 597,1.11-15. 
Watts' financial expert, Mr. Smith, testified: 
Q Yes. I want to refer to his financial [Teuscher's] summary report and 
it's several pages. I'm going to show you Page 1 there, that's one financial 
summary. There was another financial summary, No. 2. Anywhere in that 
report is there a figure that I can look to that says delays caused by Watts 
resulted in 'x' amount of dollars of damage? 
A No. 
R. 8589, p. 1174,1.1-8. 
There was no evidence that a lower priced project could have been sold with any 
better results. Kesler simply testified that higher priced units were selling slower in 1998. 
R. 8992-8999, at 8994,8997. That blanket statement does nothing to prove damages beyond 
mere speculation. There is no evidence of how much faster lower priced units were selling, 
what prices constituted lower priced units, and what costs would have been incurred to build 
such units. Furthermore, there is no evidence of how lower priced units were selling in 1999 
when the Project actually went on the market or later. Even 3rd East's attempts to use the 
Appraisal cannot establish damages. That was nothing but a forward-looking projection, not 
evidence of what occurred in the market. 
3rd East's counsel attempted to have Watts speculate about possible sales if they had 
completed a model sooner and held their grand opening in October or November as they had 
22
 3rd East's counsel nevertheless acknowledged its burden to provide information 
to the jury so they could make those adjustments. R. 8587, p. 591,1. 2-4. 
si 
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hoped to do. Watts was unable to quantify any lost sales or sales that could have been made. 
R. 8586, p. 409,1. 16-21. While damages need not be proven with specificity, they must be 
proven beyond mere speculation. 
Marketing Costs. None of 3rd East's experts testified that any costs were 
unnecessarily incurred on the Project; this failure most certainly included marketing costs. 
Teuscher, the economic expert, did not have any opinion as to whether or not the actual costs 
were incurred in order to sell the units. R. 8587, p.596, 1. 18-21. He did not have any 
opinion as to whether the $374,750 in marketing costs versus the $25,000 in marketing costs 
projected on the 10/21/97 Proforma were necessarily incurred. R. 8587, p. 601,1.17-24. He 
simply said that to miss the budget by that amount of money would be unusual and there 
would need to be some determination there as to how much of that was necessary and how 
much of it was a panicked effort to sell units. R. 8587, p. 590,1. 15-19. However he had no 
guidance to give in that regard. He was not a real estate expert and did not have an opinion 
as to whether or not the real estate market was difficult during the sales period. R. 8587, p. 
596,1. 22-25, p. 597,1. 1-3. 
Larsen could not identify one unnecessary cost for the Project. R. 8585, p. 159,1. 8-
25, p. 160, 1. 1-22; R. 8584, p. 79,1. 15-16. Larsen had nothing to add regarding the real 
estate market or marketing as by his own admission he was not a real estate expert. R. 8584, 
p. 79, 1. 15-16; R. 8585, p. 160, 1. 19-22. Kesler, the banking expert, had nothing to say 
regarding marketing costs. (The record is devoid of any such testimony and therefore, there 
is nothing to cite.) 
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3rd East did not present a real estate expert to testify as to what amounts were 
unnecessarily spent on marketing. 3rd East attempted to rely on Watts' real estate expert to 
prove its damages, but that was similarly to no avail. Watts' real estate marketing expert, 
Richards, testified that he would have considered paying some advertising expenses if he 
were to be paid a 3% sales commission, but the amount was not established. R. 8588, pp. 
810-811. Richards also indicated that he would have taken at least a full 5% commission on 
in-home sales. R. 8588,p.813,l. 9-17. The only real testimony in the record regarding how 
much a real estate agent would contribute to advertising costs came from Watts himself who 
testified that in his experience outside brokers would charge 5-6% and would pay perhaps 
$10,000. R. 8586, p. 450,1. 9-23; R. 8590, p. 1280,1. 22-25, p. 1281,1. 1-5. Nothing was 
ever established beyond that. The evidence established by 3rd East did nothing but foster 
speculation as to what could have been. While not required to be proven with specificity, 
damages must be proven beyond mere speculation. 
ISSUE NO. 5. Is 3rd East entitled to an award of prejudgment interest when damages are left 
to the best judgment of the jury? 
The trial court committed reversible error by awarding 3rd East pre-judgment interest 
when the evidence did not conform to standards for prejudgment interest prescribed by Utah 
law. A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. Corma, 898 P.2d at 1387. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that: 
[Prejudgment interest should be denied in cases where damages are 
determined by exercising the broad discretion of the fact finder, for instance, 
SE \Liz\R Watts v StevenserAAppellate Brief v lOwpd - ^ 
"[i]n all personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel, slander, 
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, and all cases 
where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of 
the jury to assess at the time of trial." 
Iron Head. 2008 UT App at fflf 6, 9 (quoting and reaffirming Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.. 88 
P. 1003, 1006 (Utah 1907)) (alteration in original). Thus, where damages are to be 
determined by the best judgment of the jury rather than fixed standards then prejudgment 
interest is inappropriate. Id.; Cornia, 898 P.2d at 1387; Shoreline Dev.. Inc. v. Utah County. 
835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Fell further states that: 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before 
judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are 
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages are 
complete and must be ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance 
with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the court or 
jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their best 
judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future 
injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of 
value. 
Fell. 88 P. at 1007 (emphasis added); Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Mgmt. 2005 UT App 430, 
Tf 35, 124 P.3d 269. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that just because a claim can be 
reduced to a monetary figure does meet the test. Canyon. 781 P.2d at 422. In Canyon, an 
insurer brought a claim for lost profits of a new business. The Court then held that lost profit 
damages are analogous to wrongful death or defamation cases because they are uncertain 
until determined by the trial court or jury and are, therefore, unliquidated. In such cases, 
prejudgment interest is not appropriate. Id. 
In this case, the trial court ignored the nature of the damage claim, the amount of 
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which was subject to the best judgment of the jury. R. 8583, p. 54,1. 20-25, p. 55,1. 1-4. 
Believing it was using the Fell standard and Utah Code Ann., Section 15-1-1(2) (2002), the 
court awarded prejudgment interest of $199,317 from December 1, 2007 through February 
13, 2007. R. 8559, 8561. Focusing solely on the first part of the Fell test, the court stated: 
it seems to me there is no other - there is no evidence that there was any 
damage that they could have relied on after that November 6 date of 2002. So 
I'm going to award prejudgment interest from November 6. I'm going to 
actually make it December 1 because I think a reasonable time thereafter to 
calculate things and issue the check would have been approximately three 
weeks to do that. That would seem a reasonable time. So December 1, 2002 
would be the date that I would commence the calculation of prejudgment 
interest. 
However, the court simply ignored the second part of the Fell test that requires that 
damages be ascertainable in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards 
of value rather than be guided by the jury's best judgment. Fell 88 P. at 1007. 
A good example is found in Cornia v. Wilcox. In that case, a cattle owner sued a 
caretaker for loss of cattle while under his care. The Supreme Court upheld the denial of 
prejudgment interest explaining: 
In this case, the jury heard conflicting testimony from experts regarding 
the cattle's expected pregnancy rates, weight range, loss rates, and market 
prices. In addition, the jury heard divergent evidence regarding the calves' 
expected gender, weight range, mortality rates, and market prices. Plaintiffs 
could not establish these elements as a matter of fact, and thus the jury was 
free to use its best judgment in ascertaining and assessing damages. 
Plaintiffs' expert did estimate the value of the missing cows in his 
damage calculation. However, "[w]hile the expert's estimates were a reliable 
enough basis for awarding damages, the assumptions used to arrive at those 
estimates are by no means the only way to arrive at [the] damages." Without 
any clear factual information, plaintiffs' damages could not be measured by 
"facts and figures" or "calculated with mathematical accuracy." Under these 
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circumstances, the trial court correctly denied plaintiffs prejudgment interest. 
Id. at 1387 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). See also Jonsson v. Bromley, 2001 
UT App 149, 2001 WL 495915, *1 (reversing award of prejudgment interest where trial 
court determined damages based upon its best assessment) (attached as A.B-1). 
In this case, 3rd East asserted the equitable claim of breach of fiduciary duty. 3rd East 
alleged that it was entitled to repayment of its capital contribution and lost profits. The jury 
was charged with determining what damages 3rd East would have received but for Watts' 
conduct. To make a damage determination, the jury needed to consider and 3rd East should 
have presented evidence to determine profits such as unnecessary costs incurred, costs of 
construction for lower priced units, a time analysis defining when construction could have 
been completed, evidence of market prices of lower priced units, average times on the market 
for lower priced units, and the availability of buyers - issues that cannot be calculated with 
mathematical certainty, and are left to the best judgment of the jury. See Issue Nos. 4 and 
5 (3rd East failed to do so). 
Even Teuscher (3rd East's financial expert) presented a financial calculation based on 
the actual costs incurred and then simply suggested that the jury use their judgment to 
determine (a) what construction costs were necessary or unapproved, (b) whether or not 
interest costs should have been incurred and if so, how much, (c) how much should have 
been spent on marketing, and (d) whether other "unsupported" costs were appropriate or not 
and if so, how much. R. 8587, p. 589,1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24; A.D-7. 
The Special Verdict Form provides no guidance how the jury applied its best 
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judgment to come up with the damage award.23 The damages, if any were proven at all, were 
left to the best judgment of the jury; therefore, prejudgment interest is inappropriate. 
ISSUE NO. 6: Did the trial court err in awarding 3rd East attorney fees of $226,400.00 
against a total claim of $269,520.00 when 3rd East's attorney's affidavit failed to adequately 
allocate attorney fees between its one successful claim for which attorney fees were awarded 
and all other claims successful or unsuccessful? 
The trial court committed reversible error by awarding attorney fees based upon an 
inadequate affidavit under Utah law. An award of attorney fees based upon an affidavit that 
does not satisfy the criteria established in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 
(Utah 1988) is reversible error. Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (holding that 
the burden of proof is on the party claiming fees and reversing an award of attorney fees for 
inadequate affidavit). Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990-91, established four main criteria 
that an affidavit must satisfy before an attorney fees award may be granted, namely (1) what 
legal work was performed; (2) how much of the work performed was reasonably necessary; 
(3) is the attorney's billing rate consistent with local rates for similar circumstances; and (4) 
are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors? Id A trial court 
has discretion in awarding fees, however, the exercise of its discretion must be based upon 
an evaluation of the evidence. Cottonwood Mall Corp. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 
1992) ("When the evidence presented is insufficient, the court's evaluation of those fees will 
also be insufficient."). Foote, 962 P.2d at 55, added that claims must also be categorized 
23
 The trial court acknowledged as much when it stated: "[T]he problem is we 
don't have any ruling by the jury that they included [the one percent] calculation in their 
judgment against Mr. Watts as part of that $474,000.00." R. 8538, p. 54,1. 17-20. 
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according to various opposing parties. 
Watts challenges the factual findings of the trial court. 3rd East's counsel presented 
an Affidavit (the "Affidavit") in its attempt to satisfy its burden regarding it's claim for 
attorney fees at $200 per hour. See Affidavits of Thor B. Roundy as to Costs, Expenses and 
Attorney Fees (A.C-7, 8). The evidence provided by 3rd East is marshaled as follows: 
1. Counsel spent 1,347.6 hrs of time in prosecution of the action (A.C-8). R. 
8488, R. 8270 (1,308.4 hours) (A.C-7). 
2. Counsel stated the time spent was reasonable and necessary. A.C-8, R. 
8488. 
3. Counsel provided a "spreadsheet" of the work. R. 8488-89, 8497-8516. 
4. Counsel provided the following conclusions as to allotment of time: 
a. communicating with client =115 hours; 
b. communicating with opposing counsel = 95.9 hours; 
c. discovery = 121.1 hours; 
d. legal research = 39.5 hours; 
e. pleading and successful pretrial motions = 348.7 hours; 
f. unsuccessful pretrial motions =102.1 hours; 
(i) plaintiffs motion regarding prejudgment interest; 
(ii) motions for summary judgment or in limine which 
resulted in dismissal of various claims by plaintiff; 
(iii) a motion regarding a lis pendens filed by plaintiff; 
(iv) motions regarding the injury allegedly sustained by Mr. 
Watts which resulted in a continuation of the trial. 
g. trial preparation and presentation = 487.3 hours; 
h. post-trial motions = 38 hours; 
i. no allocation of time for claims against Todd was made to a 
separate category although it was fewer than 10 hours.24 
The court entered the following Findings of Fact, in relevant part, as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs counsel spent 1,347.6 hours in the prosecution of this 
action from January 10, 2001 through June 30, 2007, as set forth in the 
Affidavit of Thor B. Roundy. R. 8560. 
2. The work performed by plaintiffs counsel was extremely 
R. 8489. 
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detailed, complicated and laborious, and properly reflected the nature of the 
case. Id. 
3. The work was reasonable and necessary in terms of the ultimate 
outcome of the case. IcL 
4. The evidence and the issues were complex. Id 
5. Plaintiff prevailed substantially in the case, the claims upon 
which plaintiff prevailed at trial reflected a successful strategy despite the fact 
that some overlapping theories of damages were dismissed or dropped. Id. 
6. For the most part, all of plaintiff s claims had some merit and 
related to [sic] damages amount awarded by the jury at trial. Id, 
7. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the issue of the lis pendens that 
was addressed prior to trial, the time spent in mediation or settlement 
discussion [sic], and some of the time which proved unsuccessful in pretrial 
motions is not appropriately included in the Court's determination of an 
appropriate attorneys fee award. Id. 
8. Likewise, the Court does not consider the contingency fee 
arrangement between the plaintiff and its counsel to be the guiding factor in 
determining the value of the work performed. R. 8560-61. 
9. Based upon the foregoing findings concerning the relevant 
factors in this case, the amount of attorney fees that were reasonably incurred 
and awardable against Russell K. Watts in this action is $226,400. R. 8561. 
3rd East's Affidavit and the court's findings are deficient. This action was commenced 
by 3rd East, Ted Stevensen, and Barbara Stevensen, as Plaintiffs against Watts, RKW, The 
Club and Bryan Todd ("Todd") as Defendants. Plaintiffs asserted eight causes of action; 
however contained within the eight causes of action were discrete claims against the 
Defendants including eleven claims for declaratory relief. 3rd East alleged seventeen claims 
against The Club, seven claims against RKW, twelve claims against Watts and eight claims 
against Todd. Ted and Barbara Stevensen alleged seven claims against RKW, thirteen claims 
against The Club, twelve claims against Watts and eight claims against Todd. See A.C-1. 
The claims against Todd were settled prior to trial. R. 1803-1806. All claims asserted by 
the Stevensens were dismissed prior to trial. R. 4018 at 4032-4035 (A.C-2). 
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At trial, 3rd East proceeded with two claims against Watts, negligent misrepresentation 
and breach of fiduciary duty, but only the latter was submitted to the jury for which the trial 
court determined fees were payable. A.C-5. 3rd East did not submit to the jury any of its 
claims against RKW. Id. By summary judgment prior to trial, 3rd East successfully litigated 
one claim against The Club for the 1% commission payments under the March Agreement, 
which does not contain a provision for attorney fees. Ex. 7. See A.C-2 at 4023. 3rd East 
submitted only two claims against The Club to the jury, but only one was successful (claim 
for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a contract with no attorney fee 
provision). See A.C-5. Attorneys fees are awarded only if provided by contract or statute. 
Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). See A.D-1 (no provision for 
attorney fees); Utah Limited Liability Company Acts, Utah Code Ann. § § 48-2b-101,48-2c-
101 et seq.) (no provision for attorney fees). No claims for declaratory relief were granted. 
A.C-1; A.C-5; A.C-9. 
The Affidavit fails as a matter of law as follows: (a) it fails to delineate work between 
unsuccessful claims against Watts and successful claims against Watts; (b) it fails to 
delineate work performed on behalf of 3rd East between successful claims against Watts for 
which fees were awarded and successful claims against The Club for which no fees are 
payable, (c) it fails to delineate work between 3rd East and dismissed Plaintiffs Ted and 
Barbara Stevensen; (d) it fails to delineate work on behalf of Plaintiffs Ted and Barbara 
Stevensen against RKW and Watts that were dismissed; and (e) it fails to delineate work on 
behalf of Plaintiffs 3rd East, Ted Stevensen and Barbara Stevensen against Todd which 
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claims were settled (although the Affidavit states it was less than 10 hours, it doesn't identify 
any entries which support that conclusion). While the court believed that the total claim for 
fees was not justified and somehow reduced 3rd East's claim by $43,120 (215.6 hours of time 
at $200 per hour - while 3rd East asserted that the reduction should only be 102.1 hours), 
there is no way to discern from the Affidavit or the trial court's findings, how that reduction 
was arrived at or, more importantly, if further reductions should have been made. 
Specifically with respect to the Affidavit, there is no way to determine if the categories of 
work designated therein, namely, "communications with client," "communications with 
opposing counsel," "discovery," "legal research," and "pleadings" related to unsuccessful 
plaintiffs, unsuccessful claims or even successful claims for which attorney fees are not 
recoverable. There is no way to determine from Counsel's allocation of fees to "pleadings 
and successful pretrial motions" what time was allocated to successful motions for which 
attorney fees are recoverable and to successful motions for which fees are not recoverable. 
Likewise there is no way to identify in the spreadsheet any of the asserted 102.1 hours of 
time for unsuccessful pretrial motions or the 215.6 hours the court deducted. An award 
notwithstanding these failings in the evidence resulted in exactly the type of attorney fee 
award that imposes a burden on one target defendant contrary to Utah law. Turtle Mgmt., 
Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982); Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 
990. 
The court was left to guess what the reasonable fee award should be. As in Foote, this 
is insufficient to justify an award of attorney's fees and the award must be reversed. 
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ISSUE NO. 7. Did the trial court err by awarding 3rd East expert witness fees, copy costs and 
other expenses of litigation that were not taxable costs or provided for by contract or law? 
The trial court's award of costs is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, 16 P.3d 549. 3rd East is only entitled to certain types of costs 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by case law. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d) provides for costs to be awarded to a prevailing party, but does not define 
"costs." However, Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771,774 (Utah 1980), the leading case on 
costs, defines costs as "those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, 
and for which the statutes authorize to be included in the judgment." Thus, the following 
costs awarded to the Plaintiff are not permitted. 
A. Expert Witness Fees. 3rd East is not entitled to an award of expert witness fees 
of $36,710.00 for three experts. The Frampton Court held that witness fees above the 
statutory amount are not costs contemplated by Rule 54(d). Frampton, 605 P.2d at 773-74. 
The Young court stated: "Fees paid to witnesses above the statutory allowance, as well as 
amounts paid for trial exhibits, as a matter of law, are not recoverable 'costs' of litigation, 
but are merely expenses of litigation." Young, 2000 UT 19, f 23. Only the statutory witness 
fee may be taxed as costs against the losing party. Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 
2003 UT 14, Tf 43, 70 P.3d 35, 46. See Utah Code Ann. §78-46-28 (2002). Similarly, the 
Frampton Court stated: "expert witnesses cannot be awarded extra compensation unless the 
statute expressly so provides." Id. at 774. See also John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City 
Corporation, 795 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (upholding denial of expert witness fees in 
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excess of statutory amount); Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(witness compensation in excess of statutory schedule is generally inappropriate as costs). 
The trial court stated in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that expert fees 
"were reasonable and necessary to the prosecution of this action given the nature and 
complexity of the evidence presented to the jury." A.C-9 at 8560. "Plaintiff is entitled to . 
. . expenses of litigation as consequential damages against Russell K. Watts under the 
specific facts of this case. . . ." Id. at R. 8561. If evidence of complexity were the defining 
factor of an award of expert witness fees, arguably such fees would be awarded in every case 
in which an expert is used, since experts always address complex evidentiary issues. 
3rd East argued that it was entitled to expert witness fees as consequential damages 
(i.e., foreseeable litigation expenses). R. 8242; R. 8583, p. 79. To support this theory, it 
relied on several breach-of-contract cases. R. 8240-42. Those cases are irrelevant in this 
case since there is no contract between the parties. Nevertheless, 3rd East argued that since 
Watts was Manager of The Club, the cases involving employment contracts (i.e., Heslop v. 
Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992)) would be applicable. However, this Court has 
stated that although the Utah Supreme Court allows attorney fees as consequential damages 
in "limited" breach-of-contract contexts, "[t]his exception is inapplicable [where] there 
is no contract between the [parties]." Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline Equipment, 
L.L.C., 2006 UT App 446, If 21, 147 P.3d 951. Like attorneys fees, expert witness fees 
should not be allowed where, as here, there is no contract between the parties. 
This Court further explained that "[w]here a breach of contract has not occurred, the 
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supreme court has allowed consequential damages only when the natural consequence of 
one's negligence is another's involvement in a dispute with a third party." Lewiston, 2006 
UT App at Tf22. This third-party tort rule "only applies to the recovery of fees incurred in 
resolving third-party disputes caused by a defendant's negligence. It does not apply to fees 
incurred in recovering damages from that defendant." Id. Since 3rd East sought consequential 
damages from Watts for breach of fiduciary duty and not for a third-party or contract claim, 
expert witness fees should not have been awarded to 3rd East as consequential damages. 
Since the award exceeds the statutory allowance, the award must be reversed. 
B. Copy Costs. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding $8,724.08 in 
photocopy costs to 3rd East. 3rd East did not provide billings to enable the court to determine 
the basis of the copy costs. Frampton and its progeny make clear that trial-exhibit costs are 
not a permitted cost under Rule 54(d). Frampton. 605 P.2d 774; Young. 2000 UT 91 at ffif 
20-22 (reversing trial court's award for trial-exhibit costs). Copy costs are also not a cost 
contemplated by Rule 54(d). Chase v. Scott. 2001 UT App 404, ffif 18-20, 38 P.3d 1001, 
upheld the trial court's award of copy costs based purely upon the parties' contract, for, as 
it reiterated, such costs are outside the scope of Rule 54(d). Id Because the trial court 
awarded 3rd East such costs, it abused its discretion, and its award must be reversed. 
3. Service of Process. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding $329.50 
in service-of-process fees to 3rd East. Such fees are not identified by Frampton as 
recoverable, as they are not "fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses 
[or] for which the statutes authorize ...." Frampton. 605 P.2d at 774. Lloyds Unlimited v. 
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Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512 (1988), citing Frampton, stated that the 
costs of service of subpoenas, even while necessary, are not properly taxable. Because such 
costs are not awardable, the award must be reversed. Had these costs been awardable, 3rd 
East still failed to substantiate them by affidavit. Why are they so high? The cost of service 
of process on the other defendants (i.e., The Club, RKW, and Todd) is not taxable to Watts, 
and there should be no costs attributable to subpoenaing Watts to testify (he was a party). 
4. Deposition Costs. The trial court abused its discretion by awarding $2,187.20 
in deposition costs to 3rd East ($280.40 for Ted Stevensen's deposition, $290.05 for Bryan 
Todd's, and $1,616.75 for Watts'). R. 8240. "The party claiming entitlement to the costs of 
depositions has the burden of demonstrating that the depositions were reasonably necessary 
and whether that burden is met within the sound discretion of the trial court." Lloyd's, 753 
P.2d at 512. In Lloyds, this Court upheld the trial court's denial of deposition costs on the 
basis that the plaintiff did not use the opposing party's deposition at trial. Id. Here, 3rd East 
used Watts' deposition once or twice at trial (only selected portions taken out of context) and 
never used Bryan Todd's or Stevensen's deposition. Since Stevensen was 3rd East's 
representative, his deposition was not reasonably necessary. The negligible use of Watts' 
and the non-use of Todd's and Stevensen's depositions do not rise to the level of "reasonably 
necessary". Because Appellee failed in its burden, the award must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court below committed several errors of law prejudicial to Watts (i.e., 
imposing an erroneous standard on the manager of a limited liability company; permitting 
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the jury to reach a speculative award for lost profits; permitting the prejudicial introduction, 
without a foundation of relevance or reliance and notwithstanding Watts' motion in limine, 
of banking-industry-standard testimony; permitting the prejudicial introduction of 
construction-industry-standard testimony for arms-length transactions despite such evidence 
being irrelevant and contrary to the parties' agreement). Because of the degree to which such 
errors pervade the jury verdict below, the verdict cannot stand and must be reversed. 
There is also a complete evidentiary failure to prove the high standard of gross 
negligence/willful misconduct of the manager of the company (i.e., lack of even slight care). 
In fact, the evidence clearly shows that the manager followed a rationale and legitimate 
course of conduct based upon experience and reliance on experts, which but for a 
superseding real estate slump, was the most propitious course of action for all parties 
involved, including creditors. The evidence even shows that The Club outsold competing 
condominium projects during the period. The business judgment rule was fashioned to 
protect such thoughtful and well-advised actions of managers, and, as long as the business 
judgment has a rationale basis, its protection is not diminished simply because an unintended 
injury occurs to a member of the company — a risk assumed from the outset. Since the 
evidence cannot support the verdict, the verdict cannot stand and must be reversed. 
Even if Watts were to have failed to exercise even slight care, there is a complete 
failure to prove proximate cause and damages beyond mere speculation. 3rd East's experts 
could not identify any unnecessary costs, damages calculable through objective data or facts, 
or even that units could have sold faster — the central them of their testimony being I don't 
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know. Speculation cannot support a finding of proximate cause and damages. Therefore, the 
verdict cannot stand and must be reversed. 
Because damages were left to the best judgment of the jury and couldn't be calculated 
with mathematical certainty, prejudgment interest on its damages award is prohibited by Utah 
law. Also, 3rd East's counsel's affidavit for costs and attorneys fees was deficient by law for 
an appropriate attorney fees award. Witness fees are not a cost within Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 54(d), and an award therefor cannot exceed the statutory limit. Finally, 3rd 
East did not distinguish, substantiate, or show the necessity of its copy, service-of-process, 
or deposition costs. Collectively, the court made Mr. Watts a target defendant, with 
unjustified and/or excessive prejudgment interest, attorneys fees, costs, and witness fees well 
beyond the statutory limit. Consequently, Watts implores this Court to reverse the orders of 
the trial court. 
In the event the Verdict is overturned, Mr. Watts is entitled to indemnification from 
the members of The Club for costs and attorney fees and requests that the Court instruct the 
lower court to that effect. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-155 (1996). 
Dated this 2nd day of September, 2008. ^ ^ \ s—-\ 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
POOLE & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
Attorneys for AppellantRussellK. Watts 
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